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This study was undertaken to delineate, analyze, and
aluate the various relationships established between the
vernment, prime contractors and subcontractors in the acqui-
tion of modern weapon systems within the Department of
fense. Envisioned were the achievement of two primary objec-
ves . First, to identify the relationships as currently
tablished, as well as any significant problems created by
sse relationships and second, to attempt to ascertain the
pact of these relationships, and their inherent problems,
the weapons acquisition process itself.
Research methodology consisted of an extensive literature
view along with personal interviews of key acquisition
ficials within both Government and industry.
While present relationships were found to be basically
fective and efficient, problems and inequities were perceived
rticularly by subcontractors and should be addressed. While
s size and scope of this effort precluded a conclusive
nding that present relationships, on the whole, impact
gatively on the Federal acquisition process, evidence was
and that inequities and problems inherent in present rela-
Dnships have the potential for hindering the objectives of
e weapons acquisition process and that certain remedial
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH
The basic purpose of this study is to delineate, evaluate
and analyze the various relationships which have evolved
between the Government and its prime contractors and sub-
contractors to implement and carry out the objectives of
the Federal acquisition process. Envisioned herein is the
achievement of two primary objectives: first, to identify
the various relationships which exist between Government,
prime contractors, and subcontractors, along with any inher-
ent problems caused by these relations, and second, to analyze
the impact of these relationships on the Federal acquisition
process through evaluation of key problems as perceived by
the parties involved.
It is hoped that a more thorough understanding of current
Government-prime contractor-subcontractor relationships will
benefit a variety of key acquisition personnel both within
industry and Government. Program managers, contracting offi-
cers, contract administration officials, and industry acquisi-
tion officials must constantly interact with and make decisions
impacting on one another. A more thorough understanding of
relationships may facilitate and enhance this decision making
process, hopefully, resulting in more equitable policies,
better procurement practices, and improved relations between
all participants. In addition, it is envisioned a more

thorough understanding of Government-prime-subcontractor
relationships will assist Government and industry acquisi-
tion officials in working more effectively within the estab-
lished acquisition framework, reduce the general adversarial
nature of contracting currently perceived, and further the
efforts of all parties in achieving their stated goals and
objectives. Finally, identification and analysis of key
problems with existing relationships may ultimately lead to
changes or alterations in current relations, or possibly new
relationships, resulting in more effective and efficient
procurement practices.
B. RESEARCH QUESTION
Given the preceding general objectives, the following
primary research question is posed: What is the impact of
the relationships which have evolved between the Government,
prime contractor, and subcontractors on the Federal acquisi-
tion process?
The following secondary research questions are deemed
pertinent in addressing the basic research question:
What are the current relationships?
Are these relationships efficient and effective?
What changes or modifications to these relationships
are feasible or desirable in an effort to enhance
the acquisition process?

C. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS, AND ASSUMPTIONS
The scope of this research effort is primarily concerned
with Department of Defense (DOD) weapon system acquisitions
and, with regard to subcontracting, those subcontractors
providing major critical components utilized within these
systems. This effectively means first tier subcontractors.
This study is limited by the fact that the author is not
a lawyer and, while some legal questions arise with regard to
relationships discussed, any suggested changes or alterations
in existing relationships are proposed only from the standpoint
of attempting to enhance the acquisition process. Legal
questions and ramifications arising from suggested changes are
not addressed. Furthermore, research efforts were limited
somewhat by a lack of current literature regarding the sub-
ject in question thus personal interviews and telephone con-
versations were relied upon heavily. Unfortunately, due to
time and fiscal resource constraints, the sample size of
interviewees is recognized as being inadequate to draw sta-
tistically convincing conclusions. However, it is felt that
data gathered from interviewees, when utilized in conjunction
with the existing literature base, are sufficient for the
identification of trends, and potential problem areas, within
the current Government-prime contractor-subcontractor rela-
tionship framework.
Finally, it is assumed the reader is knowledgeable to
some degree regarding DOD contract language, methods of

contracting and types of fixed and flexible contract instru-
ments. In addition, it is further assumed the reader is
familiar with the program manager concept utilized in acquiring
complex highly technical pieces of hardware.
D. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The research methodology utilized in this study consists
of two basic components: (1) development of a comprehensive
literature base, and (2) the use of personal and telephonic
interviews designed to augment and update literature informa-
tion as well as provide personal experiences and opinions
with respect to the research area. The literature base was
compiled primarily through the Defense Logistics Studies
Information Exchange (DLSIE) , the Federal Acquisition Insti-
tute (FAI) Library, the Naval Postgraduate School Library,
Federal Publications, Inc., and a review of various journals
and periodicals which concern themselves with Government
acquisition. Personal and telephonic interviews were con-
ducted with DOD policy makers, Program Managers, Procuring
Contracting Officers (PCO's), Administrative Contracting
Officers (ACO's), contract administration personnel and
industry executives involved in Government procurement at
both the prime contractor and subcontractor level. Interviews





During the course of compiling the literature base for
this study, it was noted with some concern that most of
the literature outlining Goverment - prime contractor -
subcontractor relationships, and the associated problems
and complications allegedly caused by these relationships,
was somewhat dated. However, based on personal and tele-
phonic interviews, it appears the picture as portrayed in
the literature base remains fairly accurate. This lends
credence and a sense of currency to those thoughts and
ideas expressed in the literature even though somewhat
dated.
F. DEFINITION OF A SUBCONTRACTOR
One of the first problems encountered in this research
effort was that Government procurement regulations do not
provide a definition for a subcontractor. Therefore, for
the purpose of this effort, a subcontractor will be defined
as: any person including a corporation, partnership, or
business associate of any kind who holds any contract or
agreement to perform any work, or to make or furnish any
materials required for the performance of any one or more
prime contracts or subcontracts.
G. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
This study attempts to take the reader throught the
subject at hand in the most logical manner possible.
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Chapter II is designed to inform the reader as to the
acquisition framework within which Government - prime
contractor - subcontractor relationships function. Included
are discussions as to the peculiar aspects of the Federal
acquisition process itself, and how this process affects
both prime and subcontractors , the unique economic and
legal position of the Government as a buyer, and the need
for special Government policies and procedures when
acquiring complex weapon systems. In addition, basic
relationships between prime contractors and subcontractors
and between the Government and subcontractors will be
introduced. Furthermore, the concept of "privity of
contract" will be discussed, which will later play a key
role in the discussion of problems caused by current rela-
tionships. In Chapter III a chronological background study
will concern itself with significant changes in the Federal
acquisition environment. These changes not only enhanced
the Government - prime contractor - subcontractor relation-
ships, but have also contributed to a more problematic
environment concerning these relations. Chapter IV will
then delineate the relationships as they exist today, while
Chapter V will delve into major problems with present
relations as viewed or perceived by the parties involved.
Chapter VI will offer conclusions and recommendations,






Prior to any meaningful discussion involving current
Government - prime contractor - subcontractor relationships,
pertinent key information and concepts must be presented.
First, an understanding and appreciation as to the peculiar
aspects of the weapons system acquisition environment must
be outlined. Second, an explanation as to the Government's
unique position as a sovereign and as a monopsony, with
regard to the defense industry, will provide valuable
insight into how the Government effectively shapes, molds,
and influences relations between itself and its industry
counterparts. Third, a broad conceptual picture of the
types of relationships currently established between
Government and industry will be provided as well as an
introduction to the concept of "privity of contract" which
will later play a key role in analyzing the relationships.
B. DEFENSE ACQUISITION ENVIRONMENT
The situation and circumstances surrounding the acquisi-
tion of complex weaponry are often quite different from
those experienced when attempting to procure standard
commercial products sold to the general public in a
competitively free market environment. In many cases,
defense acquisitions require industry to design, develop,
13

and produce complex systems which are totally new and
unique; often requiring advances in the state-of-the-art
to effectively deliver the end item. Such acquisitions
are characterized by a great deal of uncertainty involving
technical, engineering, production, and scheduling aspects.
Cost also looms as a large uncertainty, for even if fairly
accurate cost estimates are derived prior to the time of
award they are liable to change drastically as previous
unknowns become realities. Furthermore, while competition
may be prevalent in the earlier conceptual design and
development phases of the acquisition cycle it is difficult
and expensive to maintain competition throughout the entire
process. Usually, the company whose design and development
concepts were selected for full-scale engineering develop-
ment and production will possess obvious advantages over
the firm brought in later to duplicate the original con-
tractor's efforts. At times, the original producer may
succeed in retaining data rights and technical information
making it that much more difficult for other sources to
interject competition and its many resultant benefits.
While second sourcing has and continues to be attempted
in large weapons procurement, it appears that it is still
the exception rather than the rule.
Given this scenario, filled with risk and uncertainty
for both Government and contractor alike, and often void
of true competition, it is obvious the Government cannot
14

provide industry a proposal for a major acquisition, along
with millions and perhaps billions of dollars, and then
simply sit back and wait for the finished product to be
delivered. On the contrary, the Government insists on
achieving the visibility, control, and managerial informa-
tion necessary to protect its interests and help ensure,
to the maximum extent possible, that the system provided
will perform as envisioned, will be delivered on time, and
will cost that which was initially envisioned at the time
of award.
Adding to this already complex scenario is the concept
of public trust and the requirement for the judicious
expenditure of taxpayer dollars. If industry plans,
manages and executes a major commercial acquisition poorly,
resulting in large corporate losses, not only may key
personnel lose their jobs, but the company as well may
cease to exist. In Government, while large cost growth or
ineffective spending of funds may cost people their jobs,
it is unlikely the Government will cease to exist as monies
assigned to other projects will be reappropriated to cover
lost funds. Without the fear of bankruptcy present in
industry, there may be less incentive within Government to
allocate scarce fiscal resources wisely. This results in
the need for additional monitoring and controls, along with
enhanced Congressional and taxpayer surveillance over
major spending programs, to ensure net only that the
15

Government receives the products needed but also that the
taxpayer receives the best possible product for his money.
The end result of these aspects of the defense acqui-
sition environment has been the evolution of a complex
acquisition process built upon a multitude of Federal
statutes, regulations, executive orders, procurring agency
directives, and judicial and administrative rulings and
decisions designed to protect and to further Government
acquisition interests and policies, safeguard the judicious
expenditure of public funds, and help ensure the Federal
Government receives the best possible products for its
money.
In addition to the statutory and regulatory elements
designed to maintain visibility and control over weapon
system contractors, various organizations have also been
created to assist in this process. Three of the more
important of these are the Program Manager (PM) organiza-
tion, the Contract Administration Office (CAO) , and the
Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) . Under the PM
concept, one individual, assisted by staff members in a
variety of fields such as engineering, contracting,
logistics, production, and finance, is given overall
responsibility for the successful design, development,
production, and deployment of a major weapons acquisition
item. The PM must constantly interact, manage, direct,
and control the contractor to ensure successful completion
16

of his project. The CAO is designed to assist the PM, or
on lesser projects the procuring agency, by functioning in
the field as the Government's "eyes and ears". While the
various functions assigned to CAO organizations are out-
lined in Defense Acquisition Regulations (DAR) 1-406,
some of these functions include conducting of pre-award
surveys, designed to ascertain whether a contractor
possesses the necessary technical, personnel, and financial
capabilities deemed essential to satisfactory performance;
monitoring production progress; surveillance of schedules;
performaing quality assurance functions; and alerting the
PM, or buying activity, of potential problems which may
affect successful program completion. The primary function
of DCAA is to evaluate the legitimacy of proposed costs
submitted by prospective contractors, along with conducting
audits designed to identify any unallowable or defective
costs submitted to the Government, to ensure the buyer is
being charged fairly and equitably and that he pays only
that which is rightfully owed for products received.
Having previously demonstrated the need for Government
control, visibility and information regarding the procure-
ment of complex highly technical weapon systems, it can
now be seen that an organizational, statutory, and regula-
tory framework exists which is designed to achieve this end,
Through every phase of the procurement cycle from planning
to solicitation, source selection, negotiation, award, and
17

contract administration this complex mechanism of people,
policies, and procedures strives to maintain that degree of
visibility, control, and influence necessary to protect and
foster Government interests and objectives.
While admittedly, the defense acquisition framework is
designed primarily to protect and foster the interests of
the buyer, contractor interests and objectives are also
recognized. The framework previously described strives to
equitably share risks with contractors through the use of
differing contract types depending on an assessment of
risk incurred by each party concerned. Progress payments,
guaranteed loans, and in certain instances, advance pay-
ments are often available to contractors in an attempt by
the Government to ease cashflow and financial hardships
necessitated by the large capital outlays and long lead-
times often required in weapons production projects.
Procedures for the administrative settlement of differences
between contracting parties are also included which attempt
to provide equitable remedies for those who must deal with
peculiar Government requirements such as the Changes
Clause [10; Sect. 7], Inspection Clause [10; Sect. 7] and
Termination Clause [10; Sect. 7] . Finally, Government
owned equipment, machinery and materials are often provided
contractors to offset at least part of the extensive
capital investments required in certain weapons acquisition
programs. While the preceding examples are by no means all
18

inclusive, the point is that the defense procurement
system strives to create a two way street between buyer
and seller. Recognizing that both parties need each other,
the system, primarily through statutes and regulations,
attempts to ensure that each party's goals and objectives
are achieved simultaneously; not at the expense of one
another.
C. THE GOVERNMENT AS A SOVEREIGN AND A MONOPSONY
The ability of the Government to establish the organiza-
tional, statutory and regulatory framework which serves to
protect its interests and foster its policies, regarding
Federal acquisition, has been enhanced immensely by the
fact that the Government is a sovereign. Webster's
dictionary defines sovereign as "one having supreme power."
For our purposes, the Government as a sovereign allows it
the tremendous advantage of making various rules and
regulations it deems necessary to protect its interests
prior to engaging in the activity to which the rules and
regulations apply. When the Government, therefore,
decides new rules and regulations will enhance its
visibility or control over contractors, or when the
Government feels the lack of specific rules and regulations
are deleterious to Government interests and policies, new
rules can be created to fill the gap. Public Law 87-653,
known as the "Truth in Negotiations" Act is a prime
example. In the early 1960's, the Government felt industry
19

was taking unfair advantage of non-competitive procurement
situations and was citing faulty and erroneous cost and
pricing data used to negotiate contract costs. The passage
of this Act resulted in the requirement for contractors,
in certain situations, to submit and certify that cost and
pricing data were accurate, current, and complete. Failure
to comply with the provisions of PL 87-653 may result in
a contractor being declared non-responsive to the solicita-
tion and subsequently cause the loss of award. Submission
of other than accurate, current and complete data may
result in price adjustments, including profit on defective
cost elements, flowing from the contractor back to the
Government. The concept of the Government as a sovereign
also comes into play when discussing legal suits against
the Government for breach of contract or failing to adhere
to contract terms and conditions. This aspect will be
discussed in much greater detail in Chapter V.
While the Government has the power to make the rules
and regulations it later plays by, an argument might be
offered that if contractors are unhappy with the present
arrangement, or dislike the multitude of rules and regula-
tions, they may choose to no longer do business with the
Government. While this may be a true statement, once again
the Government appears to have the upper hand and is indeed
able to apply its rules and regulations to industry through
its unique economic position as a monopsony, along with the
20

apparent inability of major prime contractors to easily
exit the defense environment and diversify to commercial
ventures. This places the Government in a rather strong
bargaining position through which to interject those
organizational and legal requirements it deems necessary
to protect its interests. The seller, needing Government
business to remain a viable entity , has little choice but
to comply with Government policy and procedures. Often
during interviews with key industry acquisition officials,
it was related that when the Government is the only game
in town, you play by their rules or not at all. While
defense contractors have attempted to reduce their
dependency on defense procurement dollars in the past,
these actions appear to have met with only limited success,
with the possible exception of the development of transport
aircraft for commercial airlines. Professor Murray
Weidenbaum of Washington University offers the following
reasons for this situation; [49]
...concentration of management interests on
defense and space business, limited marketing
and distribution capability, lack of mass
production experience, low capitalization in
relation to sales, lack of experience in
designing, producing and servicing consumer
and industrial products and very specialized
equipment.
While the Government does not hold all the cards with
respect to defense contractors, since the Government needs
industry to design, build and deliver the end item(s), it
has certainly been effective in implementing those policies,
21

practices, and procedures deemed vital in controlling the
acquisition process. Such actions have evolved through
either its legal position as a sovereign, its economic
position as a monopsony, or due to the nature of the
defense industry itself with its numerous obstacles which
discourage contractors from exiting to the commercial
world.
D. GOVERNMENT RELATIONSHIPS
Having hopefully demonstrated the need for Government
visibility and control over contractors engaged in major
weapon acquisitions and having further alluded to the
organizational, statutory, and regulatory instruments
available to accomplish this end, it now becomes necessary
to explore the means by which these instruments are applied
to defense contractors through various relationships.
Government - industry relationships in the weapon
system arena may be envisioned as follows. The Government
establishes direct relationships with prime contractors,
who in turn establish direct relationships with any
necessary or desired subcontractors. In addition, the
Government further establishes an indirect, vague and often
nebulous relationship with subcontractors basically via the
direct relationships which exist between the Government




With regard to prime contractors - those firms charged
with the overall responsibility for system design, develop-
ment and production, as well as the successful integration
of all major system components - established relationships
with the Government are direct and implemented primarily
through statutory, legal and regulatory processes.
Statutory relationships are established between
Government and industry by the creation of laws passed by
Congress and approved by the President which dictate duties
and responsibilities to both parties regarding acquisition
practices and procedures. The Davis - Bacon Act, the
Walsh - Healy Act, and Truth in Negotiations Act are all
examples where requirements and responsibilities are placed
on industry during the performance of Government contracting
because these are laws of the land.
Legal relationships are established with industry via
the contractual process. Regulations which outline proce-
dures and processes designated to protect and foster
Government interests, as well as outlining Government
responsibilities, are stated in contract clauses. These
clauses, in turn are compiled into one document which, when
agreed to by both parties involved, constitutes a legally
binding contract. Failure to abide by the provisions of
a contract by either party, may result in a variety of
administrative or judicial remedies designed to compensate
or alleviate the injured party from damages caused by the
23

other's failure to live up to its contractual responsibili-
ties. The delineation of each party's rights and responsi-
bilities through ia contractual instrument is called "privity
of contract," The Government, therefore, establishes
"privity of contract" with any firm with which it enters
into a contractual relationship. The Government's right
to inspect a contractor's quality control systems, the
right to terminate contracts unilaterally, if deemed neces-
sary, and the right to make certain unilateral changes with
respect to contract performance are all examples of require-
ments which become binding on contractors through the
establishment of a legal, contractual relationship.
Finally, a regulatory relationship is established
between Government and industry when industry submits to
certain Government regulations and requirements not because
they are legally bound to do so but, from a practical
standpoint, must abide if they want to be considered as
viable contenders for contract award. In this scenario,
the Government's position as a monopsony, coupled with
industry's apparent inability to diversify to commercial
ventures, are the driving forces for industry compliance
as opposed to legal remedies for noncompliance prevalent
in previously discussed relationships. The Government's
right to perform preaward surveys along with the Govern-
ment's ability to inspect and certify a prime contractor's
procurement system are two examples of activities not
24

contained within any legal instrument but which are
designed to foster and protect Government interests and
applied to industry via regulatory relationships.
While those relationships established between the
Government and prime contractors obviously constitute the
cornerstone of successful acquisition ventures, they are
direct and relatively uncomplicated. An even more
interesting and complicated set of relationships occur
when prime contractors involved in Government projects
decide to subcontract major system components to other firms
who supply these items to the prime contractor for integra-
tion into the total system.
As will be discussed at some length in Chapter III,
the role of major subcontractors has continually increased
as required Government systems become more technologically
complex and tax the resources available within the prime
contractor's facility. Today, many key subcontractors
design, develop, and manufacture a variety of critical
components vital to total system performance and may impact
on ultimate program success as much if not more than the
prime contractor. As an example, in the Apollo space
program, approximately 20,000 contractors were involved;
only a few of which were prime contractors [42; p. 63] . In
addition, various documents and interviewees calculate the
degree of public funds received by subcontractors at any-
where from 4 0% to 70% of the total funds allotted to a
major acquisition. It appears the protection of Government
25

interests, the need for visibility and control of sub-
contracting initiatives, and the requirement for the
judicious expenditure of public funds are just as important
and necessary at the subcontractor level as at the prime
contractor level.
The Government has chosen to achieve the required
visibility and control over subcontractor efforts primarily
through reliance on the prime contractor. One high ranking
DOD official stated that it is the policy of DOD to pay for
and therefore to hold the prime contractor responsible for
the selection and administration of those subcontractors
deemed necessary for successful program performance.
Conceptually, this approach makes a great deal of sense.
The Government establishes a direct contractual relationship
with prime contractors, who in turn establish direct con-
tractual relationships with required subcontractors.
"Privity of contract" is established between the Government
and prime contractors, as well as between prime contractors
and subcontractors. However, as the Government purposely
avoids "privity" with subcontractors, the risks involved,
due to inability or failure on the part of subcontractors
to perform satisfactorily, rest entirely with the prime
contractor who is generally paid to assume this risk.
While this approach appears logical and quite adequate
for those subcontractors supplying routine, commercial,
off-the-shelf components, the Government is faced with a
26

different situation when subcontractors are obtained to
design and develop complex/ highly technical, sub-assemblies
for major weapons systems. Lacking "privity of contract"
with subcontractors, the Government is unable to establish
those direct legal and regulatory relationships, discussed
previously, designed to protect and foster Government
concerns and interests regarding subcontractor performance.
The Government's solution to this dilemma has been the
gradual evolution of a series of indirect relationships
established with subcontractors designed to safeguard the
buyer's interests and obtain the needed visibility and
control over subcontracting efforts while simultaneously
avoiding "privity of contract" with its inherent responsi-
bilities and additional risk exposure. Chapter IV will
outline, in detail, the makeup of such relationships





Prior to World War II, the subject of Government - sub-
contractor relationships, as well as prime contractor - sub-
contractor relations, did not significantly impact on the
success or effectiveness of the Federal acquisition process.
In those days, only a limited number of weapons development
programs were being pursued, relatively few dollars were
expended in this regard, and weapons design, development,
and production were achieved primarily by the Army using
Government personnel, plant, and equipment. With the outbreak
of World War II, however, the need for weapons increased
dramatically. In addition, the ability to reduce development
and production leadtime became critical so as to deploy re-
quired weapons to the field as quickly as possible. The
result was ah overtaxing of Government weapons facilities
and an increasing reliance on commercial industry to design,
develop and produce new weapons and technology.
In addition, the Government found itself lacking the
acquisition instruments and methodologies necessary for the
acquisition of weaponry from commercial enterprise. Professor
John Wm. Whelan, Professor Law, Georgetown University Law
Center states: {50 :p. xix]
Most of the "law" and regulations dealing with
Government contracts and most of the rules fol-
lowed by Government personnel making and admin-
istering contracts were derived from a much
earlier time when they had been devised to meet
28

quite different problems. When our entry in
World War II faced us with a real need for
revolution in Government, it found us also
without a really sensible legal structure
under which to conduct the business of the
Government as a purchaser of war material.
To illustrate this point, procurement law at this time, with
its emphasis on formal advertising, was designed primarily to
procure items with stable production and price history using
precise specifications. This situation was not conducive to
the procurement of new weapons systems often identified only
by performance characteristics, much less design specifica-
tions. Consequently, the First War Powers Act of 1941, was
passed which authorized the War and Navy Departments to enter
into contracts with industry without compliance with the
statutory requirement for formal advertising; thus ushering
in the age of negotiated procurement.
After the war, a continuing need for commercial involve-
ment in the creation of new weapon systems was realized as
the United States entered the nuclear age and the "cold war"
period; both of which placed a premium on the nation's ability
to protect and defend itself through the development and pro-
duction of modern efficient weapon systems. This fact, com-
bined with the need to upgrade and enlarge the legal basis
for the procurement of weaponry, led to the Armed Services
Procurement Act of 1947. This Act stated the principal rules
for the making of contracts with industry, for contractor
reimbursement (types of contracts) and for other ancillary
phases of contract making. Some of the provisions of this
Act include, but are not limited to, the following: [30:pl8-20J
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1. The policy that a fair portion of purchases and
contracts be placed with small business concerns.
2. The provision that purchases and contracts be made
by formal advertising in all cases in which such
method is feasible.
3. An enumeration of situations in which procurement
by negotiation is appropriate.
\y 4. The delineation of procedures for formal advertising
such as full and free competition, public opening
of bids, the necessity for responsiveness for bids,
etc.
5. A prohibition against use of the cost - plus - percen-
tage of - cost type of contracting.
6. A requirement for a determination and finding before
a cost contract or incentive contract can be awarded.
7. A limitation on the fee payable under a CPFF contract.
8. The requirement for approval of certain subcontracts.
9. An authorization of progress payments.
10. A reservation of the Government's right to examine
prime contractors and subcontractors ' books and
records related to negotiated contracts.
This Act also authorized the issuing of the Armed Services
Procurement Regulation (ASPR) , now Defense Acquisition Regu-
lations (DAR) , which outlines uniform regulations and princi-
pals to be followed within DOD when contracting with private
industry. In turn, ASPR was soon supplemented by each Military
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Department via individual service directives, procedures
and supplements.
The modern instruments which form the basis for the
statutory and regulatory relationships between Government,
and at least, prime contractors were therefore basically in
place by the end of the 1940' s. However, as modern weapon
systems advanced, with regard to technology and complexity,
and became ideal candidates for one of the seventeen exemptions
to the formal advertised procurement approach, as authorized
by the Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947, additional
problems developed for the Government. With the dawn of
negotiated procurement, dawned also the age of increasing
uncertainty, unknowns, and risk for both buyer and seller alike;
of reduced competition and the resultant loss of confidence
in cost data; and of increasingly large expenditures of public
funds for weapons design and development. By 1971 less than
12% of defense procurement actions were awarded through for-
mally advertised competitive procurement; the remaining 8 8%
were awarded through negotiated procurement. No more than 25%
of the negotiated procurements were conducted in situations
where more than one contractor was a contender for the award.
Thus no more than 37% of defense procurement actions were
awarded through competition of any form [18; p. 256]. Given
this situation, as it evolved through the fifties and sixties,
the Government's response was not to change basic relationships
with prime contractors but to strengthen and widen the score
of these relationships through additional statutes, regulations
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and directives. Statutes covering cost and pricing data
(Truth in Negotiations Act) , cost accounting standards
(P.L. 91-379), as well as recent policies covering the acqui-
sition of major weapon systems (Office of Management and
Budget Circular A 109) are just a few examples of additional
policies, regulations and procedures placed on industry by
Government in an attempt to broaden the scope of these basic
relationships. This trend has continued through the seventies
until presently it is estimated that approximately 4,000
statutes apply to the Federal acquisition process, along with
countless regulations and requirements from the Office of
Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) , DOD, Military Department
Headquarters, procuring agencies and field procurement activi-
ties.
While there can be no question that to protect, safeguard,
and foster Government procurement interests and objectives,
the Federal procurement process has grown steadily and basic
relationships encompass more situations than ever before, an
even more interesting phenomenon has occurred with respect
to subcontractors.
As the Government began to rely more and more on private
industry for the design and production of weapon systems, the
subcontractor initially assumed a secondary or supplemental
role, far less important than the critical role assumed today.
Early weapons requirements were relatively simple in design
and most work assigned to prime contractors was performed by
the prime contractor himself. Occasionally, prime contractors
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would utilize subcontracts to perform overflow type work when
prime contractors lacked adequate plant capacity. Subcon-
tractors were generally small companies who possessed the
plant capacity and limited skills necessary to build sub-
systems, provided the prime contractor supplied detailed
specifications. The more detailed sub-assemblies and
accessory equipments were contracted for directly by the
Government and supplied to the prime contractor as Government
furnished equipment (GFE) or major components were supplied
to a Government facility for assembly into the final product.
For example, aircraft components such as engines, electronic
items, landing gear etc., were ordinarily provided to the
airframe contractor as GFE. Ammunition components, however,
have traditionally been supplied to Government facilities for
assembly. In the former case, it should be noted that the
contractor to whom components were supplied as GFE carried no
responsibility either with regard to performance or successful
integration of major sub-systems and components. All risk
was shouldered by the Government along with the added burdens
and expense of having to solicit, award, and administer prime
contracts for the various components required.
As the sophistication of modern weapons advanced, complex
sub-assemblies and components were required which had to be
successfully integrated to achieve a viable finished product.
For example, a modern fighter aircraft must integrate the
basic airframe with a complex missile system, a complex gui-
dance and control system and a sophisticated test equipment
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package in order to realize an effective fighting entity.
With these new requirements and realities came a more essen-
tial role for prime and subcontractors alike.
The Government, during this transition, began to experience
difficulty in obtaining and holding the management and techni-
cal talent needed to oversee the complexities being encoun-
tered with the more modern systems. In addition, the increase
in Government resources required to aware and administer con-
tracts for direct procurement of increasingly complex and
more numerous components became prohibitive. Furthermore,
additional risk accrued to the Government when integration
of newly designed and developed GFE was attempted into a
total system.
To combat these new difficulties, the Government developed
the concept of the integrating weapon system contractor.
Under this concept, a prime contractor is selected who is
totally responsible for managing and delivering an entire
weapon system including related components, accessory equip-
ment and supporting facilities. While adoption of this con-
cept alleviated many problems experienced by the Government,
and shifted the risk of integrating major components to the
selected weapon system contractor, it also caused problems
for prime contractors. No one contractor could hope to have
all the skills, facilities or talent in-house needed to
successfully complete these major projects. Subsequently,
prime contractors began to contract directly with subcon-
tractors, not just for standard, off-the-shelf overflow
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requirements as before, but for complex design, development
and production of major system components. Furthermore, prime
contractors began to utilize subcontractors to stabilize in
house skills and facilities. Awarding subcontracts allowed
prime contractors flexibility in coping with the often accordian-
like requirements of DOD acquisition, as the number of subcon-
tracts could be increased or decreased as Defense spending
increased or decreased. This allowed prime contractors to main-
tain their facilities and personnel at prescribed levels;
reducing costs and increasing efficiency.
As the number of Government prime contracts were reduced,
more subcontracts were awarded by weapon systems contractors
increasing the flow of taxpayer dollars to subcontractors.
In many instances first tier subcontractors awarded subcon-
tracts to others thereby further disbursing public funds over
an even wider range of private industry. With increased
dollars flowing to subcontractors, many large corporations
began to accept work as subcontractors on some projects as
well as functioning as the prime contractor on others.
As increasingly complex contracts, involving greater
uncertainty and risk, flowed to subcontractors, along with
vastly enhanced sums of taxpayer dollars, the Government found
itself lacking the relationships with subcontractors necessary
to invoke policies and regulations designed to achieve the
management and control functions previously enjoyed when major
components were contracted directly. While the weapon systems
contractor concept calls for prime contractors to select,
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administer and effectively manage their subcontractors, the
Government has not been content to let prime contractors
remain totally autonomous in this regard. The increased
risks and uncertainty created for the Government, when millions
of dollars are awarded to subcontractors with whom the Govern-
ment has no contractual relationship, has lead to a feeling
of uneasiness as to the Government's control over critical
major subcontractor efforts. This feeling has been compounded
and reinforced by failure, in some cases, of prime contractors
to effectively manage subcontractor performance thereby
leading to program deficiencies, unwarranted cost growth, and
schedule slippages.
Therefore, starting with a statutory requirement for
advance notification by prime contractors concerning the
award of certain subcontracts, the Government has created a
series of indirect relationships with subcontractors designed
to invoke additional Government control and visibility over
these new key players in the acquisition arena. Throughout
the fifties, sixties, and seventies, as the role of the sub-
contractor has increased in importance, these indirect rela-
tionships have been expanded through increased statutory re-
quirements placed on subcontractors, the creation of manda-
tory flow-down clauses in Government - prime contracts which
must be passed on to subcontractors and increased Government
surveillance and monitoring at subcontractor facilities.
Additionally, the Government has strengthened its control
over the prime contractor's ability to place subcontracts
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trhough reviews of the prime contractor's "make or buy"
plan, reviews of prime contractor's procurement system, and
reviews of prime contractor's proposed subcontract manage-
ment organization and procedures.
While it will be left for Chapter IV to provide a detailed
delineation of current Government - prime contractor - sub-
contractor relationships, it is apparent that as the nature
of the Federal acquisition environment has changed, so too
have Government mechanisms and methodologies designed to
further Federal acquisition objectives and acquire the best
buy per dollar expended. Whether existing relationships
have been broadened and expanded in scope, as with prime con-
tractors, or new, indirect, and less tangible relationships
constructed, as with subcontractors, the Government's need
for visibility and control over the efforts of those desig-
nated to provide public goods and services has been demon-
strated as well as the Government's insistence that the necessary
visibility and control, in fact, be achieved. As with most
change, however, the evolutionary process of altering, and
expanding, and creating Government industry relations has not
occurred without problems. Doubts and controversy as to
whether current relations are fair and equitable to all parties
concerned as well as whether the acquisition process has been
helped or hindered via increased Government regulations and
intervention have been voiced; particularly with regard to
subcontractors. These aspects will be addressed in Chapter V.
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IV. GOVERNMENT - PRIME CONTRACTOR - SUBCONTRACTOR RELATIONSHIPS
A. GOVERNMENT - PRIME CONTRACTOR RELATIONSHIPS
Government - prime contractor relationships are relatively
simple, and straightforward; characterized by "privity of
contract." In other words, the contractual instrument is
utilized as the vehicle by which a legally binding relation-
ship is formed between the immediate parties to the contract.
By agreement as to the clauses contained within the contract,
both parties assume and acknowledge duties and responsibili-
ties which must be carried out. In addition, failure to
carry out stated responsibilities by either party may result
in the injured party exercising administrative or judicial
rights . leading to recoupment of damages or a release from the
legal relationship.
It also must be recognized that statutory relationships
exist between the Government and prime contractors because
Federal procurement law applies to those engaged in the
Federal procurement process simply because it is the law.
While it is customary to include statutory requirements as
mandatory contract clauses within the contractual instrument,
the duties, responsibilities and rights provided for in a
Federal procurement statute apply whether specifically desig-
nated by the contractual instrument or not. In fact, the
Federal judicial system has taken this statutory relationship
one step further. Under the Christian case (20) it was ruled
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that mandatory provisions of DAR, be they derived from
statute, executive order or agency regulation, have the force
and effort of law, as DAR itself is derived from statutory
authority. Therefore, whenever, a mandatory provision of DAR
is applicable to a contract it becomes part of any resulting
contract by operation of the law. This is true even where
such a provision is not actually an express part of the con-
tract [43; p. 625] .
This strong statutory and legal relationship, as well as
the more intangible relationships involving Government
leverage and bargaining strength due to its position as a
monopsony, provides the Government an excellent mechanism
for achieving the desired control, visibility, and managerial
input required to protect its interests and foster sound
acquisition practices when dealing with prime contractors.
B. PRIME CONTRACTOR - SUBCONTRACTOR RELATIONSHIPS
Prime contractor - subcontractor relationships are similar
to those established between the Government and prime con-
tractors. Again, a direct legal relationship is established
between the immediate parties which serves to outline the
duties, responsibilities, obligations and legal remedies avail-
able to those involved. Prime contractor - subcontractor rela-
tions do differ somewhat from Government - prime contractor
relationships in that, although subcontractors are at times
subject statutorily to Government controls, the relationship
between a prime and his subcontractor is established primarily
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by a commercial contract between private parties and as
such is subject to the normal rules of commercial contract
law [16; p. C-9] . The rules of commercial contract law are
embodied in the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) ; a body of
commercial contract law designed to facilitate the commerce
of the country through a uniform set of laws which strive
to [16: p. C-2]
1. Simplify, clarify and modernize the law
governing commercial transactions
.
2. Permit continued expansion of commercial
practices through custom, usage and agreement
of parties.
3. To make uniform the law among the various
jurisdictions
.
As there is no formally adopted Federal commercial code, the
UCC is therefore effective only in those states which have
adopted it as law. At present, however, every state except
Louisiana has in fact accepted the UCC within its jurisdic-
tion.
Whether the legal relationship between parties is governed
by Federal contract law, regulations and policy, or by accepted
ii //
commercial law, the primary point is that privity of contract
exists in both relationships. This affords the concerned par-
ties in both situations direct, legally enforceable avenues
through which desired duties and responsibilities, with regard
to one another, may be delineated as well as legal remedies
in the event either party fails to comply with agreed-to
provisions of the contractual instrument.
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C. GOVERNMENT - SUBCONTRACTOR RELATIONSHIPS
Probably, the most important difference between the rela-
tionship established between the Government and subcontractors,
and those relations previously discussed, is the fact that
there is no°privity of contract between the Government and
subcontractors selected by prime contractors engaged in
Federal acquisition programs. As there is no direct contrac-
tual relationship, express or implied, there is also absent
any delineation or basis for rights, responsibilities, duties
or legal remedies between the Government and subcontractors.
However, it has been alleged that as useful as lack of privity
may be to the Government in forcing prime contractors to
shoulder the managerial risks of chosen subcontractors, as
well as to shield the Government from direct subcontractor
claims, privity does not always provide the subcontractor
with a shelter against Government action. In the words of
Professor John W. Whelan and George H. Gnoss: [51; p. 681]
Statutes, regulations, and contract terms
give the Government rights against subcontractors
which in the case of many subcontracts, make the
"wall of privity" rather like a one way swiss
cheese or perhaps more aptly, like one of those
walls used in experimentation with radioactive
materials through which the experimenter can
act by means of remote control devices all the
while being shielded by the wall from the
effects of radiation.
/Even though no direct contractual relationship exists between
the Government and subcontractors, the Government has achieved
a great degree of control over the subcontracting function.
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Government control and visibility with regard to sub-
contracting actually begins long before a prime contractor
awards his first subcontract and, in certain cases, even
before the prime himself receives a contract award. In
accordance with DAR, the Government has the right to review
a prime contractor's "make-or-buy" plan [10; Sect. Ill; pt.9].
Such a plan identifies the major subsystems, assemblies, sub
assemblies and components to be made in the prime's facilities
and those to be obtained elsewhere by subcontracts. In evalua-
ting proposed make-or-buy plans, the following factors are
considered [10; Sect. Ill; pt. 9]
1. The effect of the contractor's proposed make-or-buy
program on price, quality, delivery, and performance.
2. Whether the contractor has justified the performances
of work in plant the nature of which differs signi-
ficantly from his normal in-plant operations.
3. The consequences of the contractor's projected plant
work loading with respect to overhead costs.
4. Contractor consideration of the competence, ability,
experience, and capacity available in other firms,
especially small business or labor surplus area
concerns (this is particularly significant if the
contractor proposes to request additional Government
facilities in order to perform in-plant work)
.
5. Contractor's make-or-buy history as to the type of
item concerned.
6. Whether small business and labor suprplus area firms
may be able to compete for subcontracts.
7. Other factors, such as the nature of the items,
experience with similar items, future requirements,
engineering, tooling, starting load costs, market






Through its relationship with the prime contractor, the
Government is therefore able to decide, or at least have a
say, as to whether contemplated subcontracts are in the
Government's best interest and should be subsequently pur-
sued. Assuming a prime contractor's proposed make-or-buy
plan is approved, further Government control over proposed
subcontracts is afforded via the contractual right to consent
and approve subcontracts meeting specified criteria [10; 7-104.23,
7-203.8]. While the requirements which determine when con-
sent is required vary with the type of contract, basically
consent is required under fixed-price prime contracts when
proposed subcontracts are cost-type contracts, or exceed
$100,000 [10; 23-201.1]. Under cost type prime contracts,
consent is required for proposed subcontracts of a cost type,
fixed-price subcontracts exceeding $25,000
y
or 5% of the con-
tractor provides for the fabrication, rental installation,
or other acquisition of special test equipment having a value
in excess of $1,000 [10; 23-201.2]. The primary purpose
of the requirement for consent is to help assure the Govern-
ment that prime contractors are procuring materials and
components with the best interests of the Government in mind
and that the prime contractors procuring practices embody
the same basic principles as used by the Government in
acquiring the services of prime contractors. The following
factors shall be considered for the purpose of granting
consent [10; 23-202 (a)]:
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(i) the technical justification for selection of the
particular supplies, equipment , or services;
(ii) whether the decision to enter into the proposed
subcontract is consistent with the contractor's
approved "make-or-buy" program, if any (see 3-902)
;
(iii) whether the proposed subcontract will require the
use of Government-furnished facilities and, if so,
whether proper consideration has been obtained;
(iv) the responsibility of the proposed subcontractor
(see 1-906)
;
(v) the basis for selecting the proposed contractor,
including the price competition obtained;
(vi) any cost or price analysis or price comparisons
accomplished, with particular attention to whether
cost or pricing data are accurate, complete, and
current, and to whether any required certification
has been obtained (see 3-807.3 and 7-104.42);
(vii) the effectiveness of subcontract management by the
prime contractor;
(viii) the appropriateness of the type of subcontract used
(see Section III, Part 4)
(ix) the estimated total extent of subcontracting, including
procurement of parts and materials;
(x) the extent to which the prime contractor obtains
assurance of the adequacy of the subcontractors
'
procurement system;
(xi) availability from Government sources of industrial
facilities or special test equipment (see Section
XIII, Part 3)
;
(xii) whether consideration was given to the solicitation
of small business and labor surplus area as subcontract
sources; and
(xiii) the extent of compliance with Cost Accounting Standards
in the awarding of subcontracts.
In addition, DAR states that careful and thorough evalua-
tion is particularly necessary when [10; 23-202 (b) J.
(i) the prime contractor's procurement system or performance
thereunder is considered inadequate;
(ii) subcontracts are for items for which there is no
competition or for which the proposed prices appear
unreasonable (see 3-807. 10 (b) )
;
(iii) close working arrangements or business or ownership
affiliations exist between the prime and the subcon-
tractor which may preclude the free use of competition
or result in higher subcontract prices than might
otherwise be obtained;
(iv) a subcontract is being proposed at a price less
favorable than that which has been given by the sub^
contractor to the Government, all other factors such
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as manufacturing period and quantity being comparable;
or
(v) a subcontract is to be placed on a cost-reimbursement,
time and materials, labor-hour, fixed-price incentive,
or fixed-price redeterminable basis.
While the reasons behind Government consent to proposed sub-
contracts are certainly valid and understandable, problems
arose with this practice as the number of subcontracts increased
and more and more met the criteria for consent. Several
interviewees stated that the time required to consent to
individual subcontracts soon became prohibitive and brought
complaints from industry that programs were being unduly delayed.
To alleviate this problem, the Government, following the lead
of the Air Force, instituted the Contractor Procurement System
Review Program (CPSR) . The intent was to take a systems approach
in determining whether a prime contractor's procurement prac-
tices were sufficient to safeguard and further Governmental
interests and objectives as opposed to individual reviews of
each subcontract document. Currently, DAR outlines the program
objectives as follows [10; 23-100]
:
(i) a means for evaluating the efficiency and effective-
ness with which the contractor spends Government
funds
;
(ii) the basis for the administrative contracting officer
(ACQ) to grant, withhold, or withdraw approval of the
contractor's procurement system;
(iii) reliable current information to the procuring
contracting officer (PCO) on the contractor's pro-
curement system for use in source selection, determining
appropriate type of contract, and establishing
profit and fee objectives;
(iv) an independent review of the contractor's procure-
ment system to optimize its effectiveness in complying
with Government policy; and
(v) current procurement system information for appro-
priate Department of Defense activities in areas
of Government interest. (See Supplement No. 1 for




Furthermore, DAR states that an initial review will be made
of a contractor's purchasing system when he is expected to
have sales to the Government in excess of five million dollars
during the next twelve months on other than firm fixed-price
(FFP) contracts and fixed priced contracts with economic
price adjustment provisions [10; 23-101] . In addition, DAR
states that consideration shall be given to the conducting of
a CPSR when sales to the Government on noncompetitive nego-
tiated contracts, regardless of contract type, are expected
to exceed five million dollars [10; 23-101],
The ACO is responsible for granting, withholding or
withdrawing CPSR approval based on the findings of the review.
Furthermore, DAR provides for an initial review along with
annual reviews covering areas of interest or weaknesses
discovered [10; 23-101]. Special reviews of approved systems
may also be held whenever weaknesses are revealed or suspected,
While detailed procedures for conducting CPSR's are contained
in ASPR Supplement No. 1, "Guide for Conducting Contractor
Procurement System Review" the following criteria will be
given special attention as per DAR [10; 23-103(9)].
(i) the degree of price competition obtained;
(ii) pricing policies and techniques, including
methods of obtaining accurate, complete, and
current cost and pricing data, and certification
as required (see 3-807.3, 3-807.4, and 7-104.42);
(iii) the methods of evaluating subcontractors'
responsibility (see 1-906)
;
(iv) the treatment accorded affiliates and other
concerns having close working arrangements
with the contractor;
(v) the extent to which assurance is obtained that
principal subcontractors apply sound pricing
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practices and a satisfactory procurement system
in dealing with lower-tier subcontractors;
(vi) the appropriateness of the type of subcontract
used (see Section III, Part 4)
;
(vii) practices pertaining to small business and labor
surplus area programs (see Section I Parts 7 and 8);
(viii) attention given to the management of major subcon-
tract programs ; and
(ix) compliance with the Cost Accounting Standards in
awarding of subcontracts (see Section III, Part 12)
.
While approval of a prime contractor's procurement system
generally waives notification, approval and consent require-
ments for most subcontracts, it should be noted that written
consent and approval to certain classes of subcontracts may
still be required because of their critical nature or particu-
lar circumstances call for extraordinary Government surveillance
[10; 23-105 (d)].
Government involvement in the subcontracting process by
no means ends with the reviews conducted prior to a prime
contractor awarding a subcontract. Much of the control and
visibility achieved by the Government over subcontractor
actions and efforts, are achieved through clauses which appear
in the prime contractor's contract and are subsequently incor-
porated in the subcontract. Clauses such as these are referred
to as flow-down clauses and may or may not be mandatory.
In the case of mandatory flow-down clauses, prime contrac-
tors must agree to include these clauses in any subcontracts
as a condition of their contract with the Government. A 1971
Aerospace Industries Association (AIA) study delineated these
clauses, applicable to subcontractors, that are mandatory in
nature as well as those included in subcontracts for the
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primes' self protection [1; p. 38-40]. Examples of mandatory
flow down clauses, covering the following areas, include,
cost and pricing data requirements, utilization of small
business concerns, utilization of labor surplus area concerns,
equal opportunity requirements, examination of records, con-
sent to subcontracts, excess profit, military security require-
ments, and basic data and patent rights.
In addition, certain clauses are flowed down to subcon-
tractors by prime contractors not because the Government
legally requires it, as with mandatory flow-down clauses,
but because prime contractors have agreed to similar clauses
within their Government contract. Clauses such as these must
be applied to subcontractors to protect prime contractor inter-
ests and ensure compliance with all Government provisions and
obligations placed on prime contractors. The Government also
benefits in this situation as certain Government requirements
become applicable to subcontractors as prime contractors seek
to protect themselves. For example under the Changes Clause,
the Government can make unilateral changes with respect to
specifications, delivery destination and packaging requirements
for items being acquired under defense contracts. Prime con-
tractors must attempt to achieve the same provisions with
subcontractors or face the prospect of being unable to comply
with Government change orders which effect subcontracted
components or be faced with attempting to negotiate bilateral
changes with subcontractors which they may legally refuse to
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perform. Given this situation, a subcontractor may also be
tempted to charge an exhorbitant rate for instituting the




down a changes clause to subcontractors to protect themselves
and, in the process, the Government's right to make unilateral
changes is extended to subcontractors as well as prime con-
tractors even though there exists no legal vehicle between
the Government and the subcontractor by which to achieve this
right. A further example is provided by the Quality Assurance
Clause [10; 7-104.28], The Government, in its relationship
with prime contractors, dictates a particular quality assurance
program based on the complexity and requirements of the pro-
posed weapon system. In order to meet this contractual pro-
vision, prime contractors must flow-down this requirement to
major subcontractors whose components are integrated into the
total system. Once again, the Government has realized its
objectives at the subcontractor level without establishing a
direct, legal relationship through which to convey its demands
Whether clauses are applied to subcontractors because
they are mandatory, or because a prime contractor must insist
on them to enable him to comply with the provisions of a
Government contract, the result is the same; Government objec-
tives and requirements reach not only prime contractors but
are effectively applied to subcontractors as well.
It should also be noted that flow-down clauses authorize
Government visibility into subcontractor operations as well
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as furthering Government procurement practices and objec-
tives. The Inspection Clause [10; 7-203.5] which provides for
Government inspection at all times and places, including
source inspection at subcontractor facilities, the Examina-
tion of Records Clause [10; 7-104.15] which allows Government
auditors to examine subcontractors books and accounting data,
and the Cost and Pricing Data Clause [10; 7-104.42] which
allows auditors to verify that subcontractor cost and pricing
data are in fact current actual and complete, are all exam-
ples of clauses which authorize Government visibility with
respect to subcontractor efforts and activities. These
visibility functions are physically achieved by either per-
manently stationed CAO or DCAA personnel within the subcon-
tractors plant or the use of a secondary CAO visit request.
The former situation usually occurs when a subcontractor also
performs a good deal of prime contract work and may have CAO
personnel in his plant fulltime to monitor his prime con-
tract functions. These same personnel can also assist with
subcontractor monitoring and surveillance functions if and
when required. The later situation may occur with smaller
subcontractors who have no permanently assigned CAO personnel.
In this case, the CAO for the prime contractor contacts that
CAO activity nearest the subcontractor's plant and requests
surveillance assistance. A CAO representative is then sent
to perform the required function and reports back to the
requesting activity. in either case, the Government's right
to visibility as achieved by flow down provisions, is
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invaluable in observing subcontractor efforts and operations.
While CAO personnel are forbidden from directing the actions
of subcontractors, as that is the prime contractor's responsi-
bility, they can observe subcontractor practices and proce-
dures as well as how the prime contractor is implementing
and applying Government flow-down requirements. Any defi-
ciencies or potential problems can subsequently be reported
to the prime contractor, Project Manager, or procuring activity
for quick and effective action by both the prime contractor
and subcontractor responsible. With this visibility, it is
hoped prime contractors are motivated to properly monitor
and manage the efforts of subcontractors because they know
Government personnel can ascertain whether the prime contrac-
tor is performing the subcontract management functions he
is contractually required to accomplish.
Further relationships between the Government and subcon-
tractors occur when duties and requirements, ordinarily the
responsibility of the prime contractor, can't be effectively
accomplished. For example, under the Cost and Pricing Data
Clause it is the prime contractor's responsibility to verify
that subcontractor cost and pricing data is accurate, current
and complete. However, prime and subcontractors may be com-
petitors on future contracts and the subcontractor may refuse
the prime contractor access to his accounting records and those
elements which constitute his overhead and general and admin-
istrative (G&A) rates. In this case, Government auditors must
intervene, audit the subcontractor's data, and, while not
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divulging specific information, inform the prime contractor
as to the reasonableness of the proposed rates. In a similar
situation, where the Government requires both prime and subc-
ontractors to furnish all proprietary data generated through
Government funded research and development, subcontractors
may refuse to submit this data to prime contractors for fear
it may be acquired by prime contractors for their own future
use. The Government has allowed subcontractors to submit
this data directly to the procuring activity in these situa-
tions. Finally, subcontractors may attempt to establish
informal relations with Government procuring activities by
bringing to the Government's attention problems being experi-
enced with prime contractors, such as failure to receive pay-
ments in a timely fashion or the occurrence of seemingly
unfair and inequitable practices on the part of prime con-
tractors. Technically, the Government's official position is
not to get involved in affairs between prime contractors and
their subcontractors, as the Government pays for the prime
contractor's managerial ability in these situations. However,
it must be remembered that the primary objective is to acquire
an acceptable weapon system, on time, at an affordable cost.
To the extent that prime contractor and subcontractor differ-
ences may jeopardize these objectives it may behoove the
Government to intervene, even though it is recognized that
Government action is limited due to the fear of shifting risk
from the prime contractor to the Government. Usually, the
Government serves only to elevate the problem to a higher
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level in both the prime and subcontractor organizations or
the Government initiates action to bring the parties together
so that suggested solutions to the problem at hand may be
offered. Nevertheless, informal relationships are developed
in these situations through which the Government attempts to
control, monitor, and influence prime and subcontractors
alike in the pursuit of Government needs and objectives.
In summary, Government-subcontractor relationships are
nebulous, vague and less tangible than relations established
between the Government and prime contractors or between
prime contractors and subcontractors. Nevertheless, the
Government has felt it necessary to establish the proce-
dures and mechanisms described to influence the direct prime
contractor-subcontractor relationship, as well as maintain
some degree of visibility and control over key prime contrac-
tor suppliers, thereby creating at least an indirect relation
with subcontractors. Even though less formal or tangible
than direct relationships, Government-subcontractor relations
appear to effectively foster Government interests, help safe-
guard public funds, extend Government procurement practices
to prime contractors and obtain Government surveillance and
monitoring functions over subcontractor efforts.
While these relations appear necessary and justified,
at least from the Government's standpoint, research indicates
they may still fail to achieve the degree of Government
management control desired by some program managers, cause
problems in the delineation of authority for subcontractor
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functions between Government and industry, lead to abuse of
subcontractors by prime contractors, and deny subcontractors
legal remedies for Government actions or inactions which are
available to prime contractors. Discussion and analysis
of these problems will be addressed in the next chapter.
54

V. PROBLEMS INHERENT IN THE RELATIONSHIPS
A. PREFACE
One of the principal reasons for undertaking this effort
was an attempt to determine what types of problems and diffi-
culties may be created due to present Government policy,
regarding relationships with critical subcontractors, within
the weapons system acquisition process. Through problem
identification and analysis it was hoped that suggested
changes and alterations to present practices might ensure;
thereby enhancing the effectiveness of the Government acqui-
sition process and simultaneously fostering the goals and
objectives of Government and industry alike.
While there appears to be a multitude of minor problems,
or more aptly minor annoyances, regarding present relation-
ships, this chapter will concentrate on the major, generally
widespread, problems as perceived by both Government and
industry alike.
B. GOVERNMENT PROBLEMS
As a broad generalization, interviews with Government
acquisition officials, particularly policy makers, indicate
a high degree of satisfaction with current Government - prime
contractor - subcontractor relationships. It was expressed
that Government objectives are being effectively achieved,
prime contractors are assuming "public responsibility" for
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the judicious expenditure of taxpayer dollars when subcon-
tracting, and the desired visibility and monitoring of sub-
contractor efforts is occurring. These general objectives
tend to reinforce and further support the findings of the
Commission on Government Procurement (COGP) which, in 1971,
was organized to study the Government acquisition process in
an attempt to identify problems and recommend solutions for
improvement. Within the COGP, Study Group Eight looked
specifically at". the area of subcontracting and Government,
prime contractor, subcontractor relationships and interrela-
tionships. This group found "prime contractors and Govern-
ment officials basically are satisfied with the status quo.
Each believes the present system essentially advantageous to
its objectives" [6; p. 351]. This fact notwithstanding, it
is perceived, based on personal interviews and literature,
that problems may well exist for the Government in this
environment, particularly in the area of subcontract manage-
ment.
1. Subcontract Management
The primary area of concern for the Government, with
respect to current relationships, appears to concern itself
with how best to handle subcontract management, or better yet,
how to encourage and incentivize prime contractors to manage
their subcontractors more efficiently and effectively. Govern-
ment - subcontractor relations, while considered effective by
many, are still indirect in nature and lack privity of contract.




direct managerial control nor legally enforceable methods
by which to dictate or direct subcontractor efforts. Instead,
the Government can assume only a monitoring and surveillance
role with respect to subcontractors and must rely on an
intermediate party - the prime contractor - to act and think
like the Government when engaging in the management of sub-
contractors. If the prime contractor performs well, with
regard to subcontract management functions, then the system
works as it should. Prime contractors protect Government
interests through diligent, well planned subcontract manage-
ment and the end result is the successful integration of
major components into the total system without quality,
delivery or cost problems. However, according to Government
officials, not all prime contractors are successful, effec-
tive and diligent in pursuit of sound subcontract management
practices.
There also appears to be some question as to whether
prime contractors are effectively incentivized to perform
subcontract management functions. Under a Firm Fixed-
Price (FFP) subcontract, prime contractors may be tempted
to sit back and let the subcontractor perform with little or
no surveillance knowing that the risk is on the subcontractor
because he receives no payment until an acceptable product
is delivered. Unfortunately, from the Government's stand-
point, the fact that a subcontractor receives no payment
for an undelivered or unacceptable product is of little con-
solation if subcontractor problems or failure results in
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costly program delays, technical inefficiencies, and spiraling
cost growth while the prime contractor either attempts to
"bail-out" the troubled subcontractor or search for an
additional source of supply.
Under cost-type subcontracts, which are seen primarily
when the prime contractor also has a cost-type contract, it
is again found that prime contractors may have less incentive
to effectively manage subcontractors. Subcontractor ineffi-
ciency, poor management practices, and technical deficiencies,
which manifest themselves in increased program cost, and
schedule slippages, are merely passed back to the Government
under the cost-type arrangement between the Government and
the prime contractor. While the use of more FFP prime con-
tracts, as well as fixed-price incentive type contract
arrangements, forces prime contractors to pay more attention
to subcontractor's performance, these instruments are not
always applicable in many design and development projects
early in the acquisition cycle.
While this is not to say that prime contractor mis-
management of subcontractors is so blatant or irresponsive
as to result in the default of the prime contractor or so
damage his image as to effectively preclude future awards,
improvements in prime contractor management of subcontractors
may be feasible in many cases.
In an attempt to encourage and foster improvements in
this regard by prime contractors, and to ensure Government
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interests are adequately protected, perhaps Government involve-
ment in subcontractor efforts is justified. However, due
to established Government acquisition policy it is the
prime contractor's responsibility to manage subcontractors
so that all risk created by subcontractor problems or failures
is born by the prime contractor. Therefore, the Government
is relegated to a role where it monitors the effectiveness
of subcontractor efforts, as well as the prime contractor's
management of his subcontractors, but is restrained from the
actual direction of subcontractor efforts. This policy is
necessary to preclude the shifting of risk back to the
Government due to intervention and interference into an area
specifically the responsibility of the prime contractor. The
Government's problem then is to effectively monitor and direct
prime contractor efforts to manage subcontractors and protect
Government interests but refrain from any direct intervention
with subcontractors which may remove responsibilities assigned
to prime contractors and place them back on Government shoulders
This position often becomes a difficult tightrope to walk,
particularly, by PM's and program office personnel charged
with overall responsibility for total weapon system design,
development and production but lacking direct authority
over the actions of some 50 to 7 0% of those performing the
work.
Given this delicate situation, it appears that one
way in which the Government has chosen to tackle this dilemma
is to incentivize prime contractors to better achieve what
59

they are being paid for in the first place as well as penalize
them for their failures. Hopefully this will result in less
need for Government engagement with regard to subcontractors.
More than one program manager, for example, has expressed
support for the use of award fee contracts to incentivize
contractors engaged in the design and development of major
weapon systems. Under this concept, a prime contractor's
award fee is not fixed but based instead on his performance
in certain functional areas determined by the Government.
Common functional areas, on which award fee may be based,
include technical proficiency, management capabilities, cost
control, and ability to meet or exceed schedule requirements.
By assigning fee percentages, based on target cost, to each
of these areas the Government may then award all or part of
the fees assigned to each functional area based on actual
performance. For example, consider a proposed weapon system
contract with a target cost of one million dollars and a
five percent fee assigned to technical proficiency. If the
Government felt that the contractor had performed exceptionally
well in this area, the contractor could receive as much as
$50,000 in fees. On the other hand, poor performance could
result in zero fee for this particular area.
As subcontract management is often included under the
general management functional area, larger award fee percen-
tages placed here might serve to further reward firms who
effectively manage their subcontracts, as well as penalize
to a greater degree, those who exhibit poor subcontract
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management practices. As an additional alternative, a
separate subcontract management functional area might be
established as well as the customary areas considered
currently.
While this concept has merit, it also has its draw-
backs. From an industry standpoint, the determination as
to fee is made entirely by Government personnel and is con-^
sidered extremely subjective. In addition, award fee
determinations, which are usually made by the PM, based on
the recommendation of a fee determination board, are non-
appealable. Industry has expressed concern as to the poten-
tial for arbitrary treatment in the awarding of profit under
this concept.
Another means of achieving enhanced subcontract
management, on the part of prime contractors, is through
effective and efficient subcontract management programs
designed to monitor and oversee the efforts of prime con'-
tractors as well as verify those efforts at subcontractor
locations. While the concept appears sound, there is pre-
sently little guidance from DOD as to the nature and extent
of surveillance deemed necessary or desirable. The result
has been that the CAO organizations of each Military Depart-
ment, are performing that level of subcontract management
they deem suitable. DCAS , and its field offices basically
perform those functions outlined in DAR, such as consent
to subcontracts when required, CPSR reviews, and occasional
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secondary visits to subcontractor plants, at the request of
prime contractor CAO personnel. Here, such functions as
quality inspections, production reviews, and audits are
performed. The Navy, in addition to the functions mentioned
above, has taken the concept of subcontract management one
step further. Each Naval Plant Representative (NAVPRO) and
Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion and Repair (SUPSHIP)
must establish and maintain a suitably selective and flexible
program providing for continuous and comprehensive surveillance
of the contractor's procurement system [48], This plan is
intended to encompass all aspects of the contractor's pro-
curement system and all operations which impact on the prime
contractor's procurement including, but not limited to,
determination and definition of requirements, purchasing,
estimating, financing progress payments, reimbursement of
costs, engineering, qualification approval, priorities and
allocations, schedules and delivery dates, expediting, trans-
portation, quality assurance, reliability, maintainability,
test requirements, production, material control, Government
property, provisioning, repair parts, plans, technical manuals,
industrial security, make-or-buy decisions, small business,
labor surplus and minority business enterprises programs.
Additionally, particular emphasis should be given to the
flow-down of prime contract provisions and, where applicable,
the requirements of P.L. 87-653, "Truth-in-Negotiations .
"




(1) Drawings, plans and specifications properly reflect
contract requirements including those related to performance,
quality, maintainability and reliability.
(2) Quantities ordered are realistic and reflect effec-
tive material control and useage.
(3) Awards are made on a competitive basis whenever
feasible.
(4) Delivery or performance schedules permit the con-
tractor to keep his prime contract work on schedule.
(5) Cost/price analysis and negotiations result in fair
and reasonable prices.
(6) Administration provides the prime contractor reason-
able visibility of the subcontractor's cost, schedule and
technical performance.
In addition, NAVPRO and SUPSHIP personnel are
sncouraged to attend contractor meetings regarding subcon-
tractor efforts, critical subcontracts are to be identified
as early as possible for special management attention (although
tfhat constitutes special attention is not specified) and
contractor source selection methods must be thoroughly reviewed
to ensure conformance with DOD acquisition policies [11]
.
Furthermore, frequent examination shall be made of the prime
contractor's records regarding subcontractor cost, schedule,
and technical performance.
The Air Force has further expanded subcontract manage-
ment functions. Based on the fact that many past Air Force
system acquisition projects had experienced trouble arising
from subcontractors, as well as the fear that prime contrac-
tors were not effectively applying systems acquisition manage-
ment policies to subcontractors, an Air Force System Command
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Study was initiated in the early 1970' s. The objectives
of the study were as follows [45]
.
1. Determine whether the Air Force has required prime
contractors to practice DOD acquisition policies and manage-
ment techniques in their relationships with subcontractors.
2. Evaluate contractual instruments (government-prime
and prime-sub) to assess the degree to which such requirements
are reflected.
3. Evaluate the actual practices of prime and subcon-
tractors in response to these requirements.
4. Determine the level of USAF and prime contractor
management attention focused on technical, schedule, and
cost performance of subcontractors.
Basic observations emanating from the study indicated
that each program office managed subcontracts in its own way;
some monitored closely, others didn't; program offices varied
as to frequency of visits to subcontractor plants; the Air
Force relied too heavily on annual CPSR's to provide checks
and balances, and CPSR's relied too heavily on source selec-
tion, • pricing, and technical procurement details as opposed
to flow-down of acquisition policies, technical requirements,
and subcontract management. One rather surprising fact was
that although approximately 50% of Air Force acquisition
dollars were flowing to subcontractors, only about 1% of Air
Force Contract Management Division (AFCMD) personnel were
devoted to surveillance of the subcontract management area.
In an effort to correct Air Force deficiencies as
discovered by this study, the AFCMD was reorganized to
incorporate a new functional area entitled Subcontract
Management. It was felt that the Air Force Contract Management
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Division Subcontract Management (AFCMD/SM) organization
would consolidate staff responsibility for subcontract
management and allow the AFCMD Commander an increased capa-
bility to effectively monitor and influence the management
of vital subcontractors. In addition AFCMD/SM was tasked
with the following functions: [44; p. 65]
(1) Support to SPO/buying office.
(2) Make-or-buy review.
(3) Purchasing system surveillance.
(4) Advance notice/consent reviews.
(5) Support administration delegation.
Aside from the subcontract management organization
established at AFCMD, field level subcontract management
teams were established at each Air Force Plant Representative
Office (AFPRO) . Duties of AFPRO/SM are the same as those
delineated at the headquarters level.
The subcontract management function within the Air
Force is built upon two primary principles. First, the early
identification, coordinated selection, and AFPRO/SM real-time
evaluation of prime contractors' management of major/critical
subcontractors form the cornerstone of successful Air Force
subcontract management. Second, the contractor's management
of major or critical subcontractors requires the same inten-
sity of surveillance as that provided by the AFPRO for sur-
veillance of the contractor's total in-house operation [44;
p. 65] . It can also be said that Air Force subcontract manage-
ment is "dedicated" in the sense that its primary purpose is
the evaluation, monitoring and surveillance of a prime
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contractor's management of subcontractors. No other CAO
organization was found that assigns a team the specific func-
tion of subcontractor management. Instead, in other CAO's,
personnel assigned the normal contract administration func-
tions, with regard to the management of prime contractors,
assume additional duties whenever subcontract management
functions arise.
It is obvious a continuum has been established regarding
which tools are most effective and efficient, as well as the
degree of monitoring and surveillance necessary to both pro-
mote Government interests and incentivize prime contractor's
interest in subcontract management. Furthermore, where each
individual organization lies on this continuum appears to
be based on organizational philosophies stemming from experi-
ence and past history with regard to subcontracting problems,
as opposed to any central guidance or direction from the DOD
hierarchy. While individual organizational approaches to
subcontract management may indeed constitute the best approach,
many questions come to mind concerning such independent efforts.
Given that all three administrative organizations
mentioned (DCASPROs, NAVPROs and AFPROs) are assigned adminis-
trative functions over prime contractors in which major sub-
contractors are intimately involved, which subcontract manage-
ment approach is the most feasible, which best fosters Govern-
ment interests, and which motivates prime contractors to en-
hance their subcontractor management efforts most effectively
and efficiently? The researcher found that each administrative
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organization feels their efforts in this regard are adequate
and efficient to do the job. If in fact, methodologies such
as consent to subcontract, performance of CPSR's, and occa-
sional secondary visits to subcontractor facilities are
really all that is required to monitor subcontractor efforts,
as well as to oversee prime contractor responsibilities in
this regard, then it appears the Navy and Air Force approaches
waste valuable resources in time, money and personnel through
unnecessary involvement. On the other hand, the Navy and
Air Force feel that additional procedures, which provide a
continuous real-time picture of subcontractor efforts. are
needed above and beyond the one time snapshots provided by
consent to individual subcontracts or CPSR. The Air Force
further believes that only through a dedicated subcontract
management staff, both at AFCMD and at the AFPRO, will the
best real-time picture be achieved. Personnel in AFCMD/SM
feel their program has been the primary reason many Air Force
prime contractors have drastically enhanced their efforts in
the subcontract management area and, without such a dedicated
effort, the degree of subcontract management at the prime
contractor level would have been substantially less. Does
this mean DCAS and the Navy aren't doing a sufficient job?
Could they further enhance prime contractors to pay more
attention to subcontractor efforts if they adopted the Air
Force methodology? Is the Air Force merely wasting men and
money which could be applied more effectively in other areas?
Whose approach is more effective?
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2. Current Subcontractor Management Techniques
Further compounding these questions are other inter-
esting considerations discovered during research interviews.
First, it appears that consent to subcontracting may not be
as effectively performed as envisioned. Discussions with
ACO's, and former ACO's, indicate the depth of reviews are
not as thorough and often not as encompassing as the require-
ments outlined in DAR, dictate.
Instead , some interviews indicate consent may consist
only of a determination as to whether a proposed subcontractor
is listed in Dunn and Bradstreet, what his financial rating
is, and whether he is on the debarred, ineligible, or suspended
list. While, hopefully, this is the extreme, such revelations
do not auger well for reliance on the consent to subcontract
provisions to ensure prime contractors are adequately pro-
tecting Government interests and properly applying Government
requirements to subcontractors. In no case could an ACO, or
former ACO interviewed, ever remember rejecting a proposed
subcontract for not meeting the required criteria as outlined
in DAR.
The CPSR program has also undergone changes which some
feel may render it less effective. Recently, the dollar
threshold used to identify those firms for which a CPSR is
conducted was raised from anticipated yearly Government business
of $5 million to $10 million. Furthermore, after the initial
CPSR, for those firms exhibiting approved systems over the
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past four years, subsequent reviews will be conducted every
three years vice two years. Finally, due to personnel resource
reductions, the number of CPSR personnel assigned to a review,
as well as the time allotted for CPSR's, have diminished. For
example, where previous requirements called for a three-man
team to spend three weeks reviewing a contractor's procure-
ment system, now two individuals must conduct the review in
two weeks. While the impact of these changes have yet to be
fully determined, concern was expressed as to the possibility
of inadequate coverage of firms now below the new threshold,
the fact that three year reviews provide an even less realis-
tic appraisal of contractor's procurement systems, and that
reduction in personnel and time allotted for CPSR's will
result in inadequate determinations as to the true effective-
ness of procurement systems.
With these findings, more confidence in the Navy and
Air Force approaches may be warranted. However, DCAS personnel
stated that it would be impossible for them to adopt Navy or
Air Force methodologies, even if desired, due to the number
of contractors under their cognizance and the scarcity of
personnel resources to devote to subcontract management func-
tions. The Navy and Air Force approaches are not without
problems either. While they apparently can overcome the
potential problems regarding consent to subcontracts and CPSR,
through continuous real time surveillance of subcontractor
efforts, they also call for greater involvement and more sur-
veillance of the prime contractor's management of subcontractors
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Prime contractors often expressed resentment at this degree
of involvement, particularly when Government personnel over-
step their bounds and fail to distinguish between monitoring
and managing subcontractor efforts. Prime contractors further
contend that if they are being paid to obtain and manage sub-
contracts they should be free to do so with a minimum of
Government intervention. It should also be noted that some
Government contract administration personnel feel the same
way. In fact, one contract administrator stated, that in
his opinion, the degree and willingness of Government per-
sonnel to get involved has lead to prime contractors requesting
Government assistance with regard to subcontracting functions
that are clearly the responsibility of the prime contractor.
For example, under P.L. 87-653, it is the contractor's respon-
sibility to verify a subcontractor's cost and pricing data.
If a subcontractor refuses to allow the prime to audit his
accounting records, Government auditors will step in and per-
form this function. It has been alleged, however, that cer-
tain prime contractors may claim they have been denied access
to a subcontractor's records when this isn't the case. This
allows prime contractors to utilize Government auditors to
perform tasks for which the prime is paid to conduct. While,
admittedly, this may be an isolated complaint, it does under-
score the potential for problems and controversy presently




In summary, controversy is definitely present both
within industry and Government^ as to how best to manage sub-
contractors, as well as incentivize prime contractors to do
better in this regard. What tools and organizational struc-
ture affords the most effective and efficient management;
and how much involvement, if any, on the part of the Govern-
ment is really necessary? The questions and uncertainty pre-
sented here are directly related to present Government policy
regarding the handling of subcontracting, present Government-
prime contractor-subcontractor relationships, and Government
insistence on placing the responsibility for subcontract
management with prime contractors while simultaneously
reserving the right to get involved whenever and wherever it
is deemed appropriate. It appears this controversy may only
be resolved through a change in policy and relationships or
the creation of total confidence, on the part of Government
acquisition officials, with regard to a prime contractor's
ability to effectively place itself in the Government's posi-
tion with respect to interests and requirements when subcon-
tracting. Neither alternative appears likely, as the former
may shift unacceptable risk to the Government while the latter
represents Utopia. Some degree of Government involvement
with respect to subcontractor efforts and management appears
inevitable.
C. PRIME CONTRACTOR PROBLEMS
As was the case with high ranking Government acquisition
officials, prime contractor interviewees were basically
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satisfied with Government-prime contractor-subcontractor
relationships. Most prime contractor personnel interviewed
agreed that the Government had the right to monitor a con-
tractor's efforts regarding subcontractor management and
indicated they could understand why the Government might feel
compelled to perform monitoring and surveillance functions to
a certain degree, however, they did not see the need for
detailed involvement. Prime contractors contend it behooves
them to effectively manage subcontractors, without Government
intervention, as they realize full well that failure on the
part of critical subcontractors will be detrimental to their
goals as well as to the ultimate customer. Through the
practice of established fundamental Government procurement
procedures, prime contractors feel they can effectively foster
their own goals and objectives as well, and thereby help
assure a quality product is delivered on time and for a
reasonable sum of money. This rationale appears self-motivating
to them and they see little need for Government efforts to
increase incentives with regard to enhanced subcontract
management. This is quite a different view then that expressed
by Air Force personnel who claim their subcontract management
program is really responsible for enhanced subcontract
management efforts on the part of prime contractors.
Prime contractors also favor Government programs such as
the consent to subcontract requirement and the CPSR program.
Interviewees often stated that they would rather the Government
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review the provisions of their subcontracts prior to award
as opposed to having the Government express doubts and reser-
vations with subcontract arrangements after award when it
was much more difficult to effect changes. With regard to
CPSR, prime contractors viewed it as an opportunity to improve
their procurement systems and enhance their operation through
the use of Government procurement experts. Prime contractors
were also queried as to whether Government regulations and
requirements, stemming from direct Government-prime contractor
relations as well as those subsequently included in prime
contractor-subcontractor relations, were not overly burden-
some and costly. While there was no question that complying
with the multitude of Government rules and regulations was
indeed viewed as burdensome and costly, large prime contrac-
tors doing business with the Government appeared very
complacent and resigned to these encumberances as a fact of
life. Many expressed the view that if a great deal of your
business was dependent on Government contracts what choice did
you have. Furthermore, additional costs caused by Government
regulations and requirements were merely included in company
proposals and passed along to the buyer.
With regard to problems created by Government-prime
contractor-subcontractor relations, the few that were expressed,
were not with the acquisition system itself but with Government
personnel and their interpretations as to how the system
was designed to function. For example, one prime contrac-
tor's representative stated his organization was perfectly
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happy to have Government personnel monitor their management
of subcontracts, attend subcontractor meetings, make sugges-
tions and assist with the solving of subcontractor problems.
However, when monitoring by Government personnel became
management and recommendations became directives, they
became upset because they understood it was the prime con-
tractor's responsibility to manage subcontractors; not
Government's. Other prime contractors expressed similar views.
There appeared to be a rather ill-defined line between Govern-
ment suggestions and directives with regard to subcontractors
which, when crossed by Government personnel, caused varying
degrees of difficulty and animosity. One prime contractor
s
related how his PCO reviewed a large number of his subcontract
negotiation files and actually began to tell him how to nego-
tiate, and what to offer prospective subcontractors. The
prime contractor felt he was in a better position to ascer-
tain whether a subcontractor's price was fair and reasonable,
in light of current market and industry conditions , and highly
resented Government personnel acting as though the prime
contractor was incapable of performing the job properly.
While other problems were mentioned by various prime
contractors, they appeared to be isolated incidents and minor
in nature. Only the perception by contractors of Government
personnel overstepping their authority was considered a
significant problem which may negatively impact on future




Although Government representatives and prime contractors
interviewed report their operations relatively devoid of
problems in the Government - prime contractor - subcontractor
relationship, the same cannot be said by the subcontractor
in this scenario. Subcontractors appear to face problems
with regard to their relations with both prime contractors
and the Government.
As to subcontractor problems with prime contractors, Study
Group Eight of the COGP outlined major areas of concern in
its 1972 report [6; p. 350].
In a negotation sense, subcontractors face
particularly challenging problems. For example,
prime contractors have objected, with consider-
able justification, to variances they find in
working with different elements of the Government.
These are minor as compared to the variables
with which a subcontractor is confronted in
terms of dealing with many major firms — and
the subcontractor does not have the depth of
staff to apply to the complexities. The prob-
lems here are compounded by a general tendency
on the part of prime contractors to pass down more
risk and fewer benefits than they received from
the Government. Subcontractors may not only
lack awareness and understanding, as previously
noted, but in addition may consider themselves
handicapped by one additional factor — monop-
sony. Factually, the prime contractor in many
cases is as much of a monopsonist as the Govern-
ment. Upon receipt of a major systems contract,
the prime contractor may well be "the only game
in town;" and the prime contractor looms as
large and formidable to the prospective subcon-
tractor as the Government once appeared to the
prime contractor.
Furthermore these problems appear to be intensified by
Government actions and inactions as will be discussed shortly.
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Subcontractor problems with the Government appear to
originate mainly from the fact that the lack of privity
between the Government and subcontractors precludes direct
legal recourse for subcontractors while present relationships
allow direct Government action as to subcontractor efforts
as previously outlined in Chapter IV. Frank Reda in an
article entitled "Subcontractors: Privity and Severin"
stated: "Sometimes a subcontractor must feel like the
invisible man. He is there but nobody sees him" [33; p. 365].
Frederick Sass Jr. , a lawyer for the Navy Department in a
speech before the Southwestern Legal Foundation found another
way to describe the problems of subcontractors. Sass, alluding
to a cartoonist with the New Yorker Magazine who never uses
words but draws people and animals and lines to symbolize
his message stated [35]
:
They're not always comprehensible, but there is
one I'm sure I understood. It is a drawing of
a rather hatchet-faced man, with a line drawn
above him from his forehead, a line which loops,
whirls, zigzags, twists, forms confused shapes
and angles, and loops back on itself a hundred
times. The little hatchet-faced man is obviously
befuddled. Plainly, he is thinking about the
problems of subcontracting.
Problems of subcontractors do indeed appear to be numerous
but identifying and dealing with them may help enhance the
stability and productivity of the Federal acquisition process.
The final statements of Study Group Eight
y
regarding subcon-
tractor feelings with regard to their problems, and the
necessity for maintaining a viable subcontractor base under-




Subcontractors, on the other hand, generally are
far less content with the present mode. They
are not convinced that subcontracting for the
Government, with its unique complexities and
demands, represents an attractive long range
market — particularly in view of the remote,
and perhaps even indifferent, treatment accorded
by the Government.
The Study Group believes that a dynamic, healthy
family of subcontractors is essential to the
Government procurement process. To the extent
that the present system mitigates against this,
remedies are indicated.
While it is not feasible to address every single subcon-
tractor problem uncovered during the course of this effort,
it is felt that the root of many subcontractor problems
originate from two key areas: prime contractor overreach
and the lack of privity between the Government and subcon-
tractors which precludes direct remedial action against the
Government when warranted. These two areas will be discussed
separately.
1. Overreach
Prime contractor overreach is a term used to describe
an alleged general tendency on the part of prime contractors
to attempt to pass down more risk and fewer benefits to sub-
contractors then received by the prime contractor from the
Government. It also refers to discriminatory and unequitable
treatment by prime contractors with respect to offerors
attempting to win subcontractor awards. This allows prime
contractors to diffuse and mitigate a certain amount of their
contractual risk as received from the Government and reduce
their chances of poor and unsatisfactory performance.
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Research indicates that the following are examples
of how prime contractors may treat subcontractors unfairly
and shift risks via overreach.
1. A prime may underbid a contract deliberately and
then make up the difference by driving an overly
hard bargain with subcontractors who need the work.
2. Prime contractors may receive a cost-type contract
from the Government but pass on a FFP contract to
subcontractors when the nature of work and risks
involved may be more conducive to a cost-type
instrument.
3. Primes may discriminate against certain subcontrac-
tors by allowing other subcontractors to submit late
proposals without offering the extra time to all
offerors.
4. Prime contractors may engage in auction techniques
by leaking to subcontractors the price which must
be met to receive the award.
5. Prime contractors often change, alter, expand or
restrict those terms and conditions passed on to
subcontractors so as to push risk downward or often
obtain a better position with subcontractors regarding
duties and responsibilities between the parties.
It should be noted that the Government, while claiming
it is not concerned with terms and conditions between prime
contractors and subcontractors, except for ensuring that
prime contractors achieve those Government rights contained
in mandatory flow-down clauses, may contribute and allow
overreach to occur, at least inadvertently. It appears that
the Government has been less than explicit regarding the
wording of mandatory flow-down provisions. While in some
cases the Government directs that clauses be incorporated
exactly as written, such as Notice and Assistance Regarding
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Patent and Copyright Infringement, Contract Work House Stan-
dards Act, and Overtime Compensation, in the majority of cases
the Government only requires that the substance of certain
provisions be incorporated into subcontracts. This allows
prime contractors the freedom to change and alter clauses
to their advantage as long as the substance of the clause is
retained and serves to protect or achieve Government rights.
The addition of a phrase or the deletion of one, however,
may drastically change the meaning of a clause. For example,
in those instances where the Government requires a prime
contractor to secure a right from a subcontractor it may be
possible for the contractor to add the words "and contractor"
after the word "Government" thereby obtaining for the prime
contractor rights achieved for the Government. This might
allow prime contractors access to subcontractor records and
data or achieve patent license rights, for example, when the
original intent of the Government was only to have the prime
contractor obtain these rights for the Government alone. Lack
of explicit wording as to mandatory flow-down clauses tends
to open the door for prime contractors in this regard. Unless
the subcontractor is sophisticated enough to realize the
prime contractor is taking advantage of the situation and
has enough leverage to change contract wording, he may find
himself legally obligated to conform to contractual provisions




Similar examples of "overreach" occur with regard
to clauses that are not subjected to flow-down by require-
ment of the Government but which are included in subcon-
tracts to protect the prime contractor. Not only do prime
contractors protect themselves but often protection consists
of altering clauses to their advantage, at times explaining
to subcontractors that the clause is required by the Govern-
ment, when in fact no such requirement exists. The Changes
Clause provides a classic example. While few if any subcon-
tractors would probably argue with the legitimacy of a prime
contractor including a changes clause identical to that used
by the Government, research has found that prime contractors
often expand the changes clause to provide them the unilateral
right to change quantity and delivery dates in addition to
the normal provisions of the Government changes clause.
Warranty and option provisions included in any prime
contract must also be flowed down to subcontractors to allow
prime contractors to fulfill Government obligations imposed
by those provisions. However, prime contractors often extend
warranty provisions with subcontractors and may change option
time periods, quantities, and prices in an effort to obtain
a better deal from subcontractors.
Finally, the Termination for Convenience Clause offers
still another example of overreach. Because the Government
may terminate a prime contract for convenience, prime contrac-
tors must protect themselves by requiring the same provisions
with their subcontractors. However, the clause recommended
80

by the Government in DAR [10; 8-706] may not be in the best
interests of subcontractors. First, it allows prime contrac-
tors to terminate subcontracts even though the Government
has not terminated the prime contract. In effect, prime
contractors can terminate subcontracts for whatever reason
they choose. While this may appear fair and equitable one
must realize that under this clause a prime contractor may
terminate his subcontract for any reason without having to
pay anticipatory profit or damages. This is not the case
involving terminations under the UCC. Second, the clause
provides a prime contractor access to subcontractor accounting
records so that termination settlement may be achieved. Third,
subcontractors are given six months to prepare their claims,
while prime contractors receive twelve months from the Govern-
ment. Finally, even though this clause is strongly recommended
to prime contractors for use in subcontracts, it is not manda-
tory. However, subcontractors interviewed alleged that prime
contractors have upon occasion indicated it is a required
Government clause.
While additional examples constituting prime contrac-
tor "overreach could be presented, the above examples typify
the existence of "overreach." Every Government and subcon-
tractor representative interviewed conceded that "overreach"
in fact was a way of life for many subcontractors. Various
articles in the literature, as well as the COGP report, also
indicate the practice exists. The more pertinent questions
become whether or not "overreach" is detrimental to subcontractors
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in general, and the Federal acquisition process in particular,
and whether the Government can or should get involved in an
attempt to alleviate the present situation.
In an attempt to ascertain the effect of prime con-
tractor overreach, for the purposes of this research effort,
subcontractors were divided into three categoriys: "A", "B",
and "C". "A" category companies were large major defense
concerns who performed as both prime contractors as well as
subcontractors when involved in Government acquisition. "B"
category firms were medium-sized companies who performed as
either small prime contractors or subcontractors but were
primarily thought of as key subcontractors. "C" category
firms were small business firms with less than one thousand
employees.
Interviewees indicated that prime contractor "over-
reach" did not impact significantly on large category "A"
firms. While "overreach" was attempted on occasion, cate-
gory "A" firms were too powerful and possessed too much lever-
age of their own to submit to any terms and conditions which
might place inordinate risk upon them. Category "A" firms
would more quickly refuse contracts if the risks were too
great, as they had more avenues and opportunities for addi-
tional business than smaller firms. Category "A" firms were
used to constantly dealing with the Government, were thoroughly
familiar with Government clauses and requirements and could
easily detect whether prime contractors were merely protecting
Government interests or attempting to inequitably pass risks
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down the line through proposed terms and conditions. Further-
more, category "A" company personnel indicated that their
prime contractors were far less likely to attempt "overreach'"
with them because next month their own company may be a prime
contractor on a different award and therefore be in a position
to retaliate against those who had previously attempted
"overreach.
Although the research was structured to distinguish
between category "B" and "C" firms, they provided similar
views with respect to "overreach" and are therefore discussed
together. Category "B" and "C" firms interviewed definitely
believed major prime contractors regularly attempted "overreach."
Furthermore, each representative related individual examples
of how prime contractors passed down riskier contracts than
received from the Government and generally drove tougher bar-
gains with their companies in negotiations than the Government
drove when their companies attempted to win Government prime
contract awards. Naturally, each firm interviewed stated
they tried to counter those aspects of a proposed subcontract
they felt detrimental to their interests but their ability to
do so was dependent on their relative bargaining strength at
the time of each individual subcontract. Subcontractor com-
ments involving "overreach" included the following. First,
the more competition achieved by prime contractors the more
a subcontractor's bargaining position was weakened. The more
subcontractors available to bid the more likely the prime
contractor could find a company hungry enough to accept risks
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considered too great by other offerors. Many subcontractors
interviewed stated this caused them to strive to achieve
technolgocial superiority, mainly through company funded
research and development, in an attempt to become sole source
with regard to their particular product line so as to achieve
their goals and avoid "overreach" at the negotiation table.
Second, the more dependent a subcontractor's business was on
large Government prime contracts the more effective "over-
reach" became. Most subcontractors therefore attempted to
diversify their efforts between commercial and Government
business so as to gain some ability to refuse subcontracts
with unacceptable risks, terms, and conditions. Third, some
subcontractors attempted to counteract the altering of terms
and conditions by negotiating forward agreements, as to stan-
dard terms and conditions with major firms, which would apply
to all subcontracts thereafter. This avoided the tendency
on the part of subcontractors to submit to more risk than was
prudent due to time pressures often experienced when subcon-
tracts had to be hammered out quickly so as not to unduly
delay commencement of work. While the theory appears excellent,
the disadvantage of forward agreements is that they often take
years to negotiate and each prime contractor having his own
terms and conditions must be dealt with separately. Fourth,
with the possible exception of one sole source subcontractor,
every category "B" and "C" firm interviewed stated that they
had been forced to accept contracts where risks were higher
than they would have liked and on occasion they had lost money
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on such contracts. Fortunately, they had made money on more
contracts than they had lost and were still in business but
one firm stated that prime contractor overreach was one
reason his company had reduced Government business from about
65% to 35% of his total business. Fifth, subcontractors
emphatically stated that to effectively function as a subcon-
tractor on Government projects and attempt to obtain fair and
equitable contracts from prime contractors, a contract
administrator, familiar with Government rules, regulations,
and relationships between the involved parties was a must.
Many companies stated that prior to creating the contract
administrator position their problems with prime contractors
were compounded by a lack of knowledge regarding mandatory
vice non-mandatory Government flow-down provisions and the
specific wording and meaning of Government clauses, regulations,
and requirements. This left them relatively defenseless to
counter or ever recognize the potential pitfalls of prime
contractor terms and conditions. It was also stated that
this situation was still felt to exist today for those smaller
subcontractors who lack the resources necessary to acquire
competent contract administrators, accountants and lawyers
necessary to protect their interests when dealing with
Government rules and regulations as well as giant defense
contractors.
Finally, most subcontractors stated that if prime con-
tractor requirements, deemed less than equitable by subcon-
tractors, could not be altered, an attempt was made to cover
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any additional perceived risk through contingency pricing
designed to offset the occurrence of those risks. For example,
if a prime contractor extended the subcontractor warranty
period over and above that required of the prime contractor
by the Government, the subcontractor increased his prices to
cover the extra warranty period. Similarly, if a prime con-
tractor tightened the specifications
y
with regard to components
/
to provide an extra margin of safety with which to meet
Government requirements, the increased likelihood of a sub-
contractor being unable to achieve these tighter specifica-
tions were reflected in the contract price.
With regard to suggestions for altering present
'relationships, those subcontractors less able to combat
'overreach were receptive to minor changes designed to limit
the practice. Such changes could include increased Government
intervention and surveillance over prime contractors or estab-
lishment of a Government set of standard terms and conditions
for subcontractors which would achieve the objectives and
protect the interests of the Government while limiting a
prime contractor's present ability to alter many current DAR
clauses for his own benefit. Mr. Norm Singer, Vice President
of Federal Publications recently advocated such a proposal
[41; p. 70-76] . Under his proposal, the Government would
develop a standard set of terms and conditions to be used by
the prime contractor in the subcontract which would foster
and protect Government requirements as well as include all
provisions necessary for a prime contractor to fulfill his
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Government obligations. For example, all mandatory flow-down
provisions would be included as well as self protection
clauses such as the Changes Clause. However, the Changes
Clause would provide the prime contractor only those rights
with subcontractors as he currently enjoys with the Government
and nothing more. The same rationale would prevail for other
self protection clauses contained in the standard set of terms
and conditions. Prime contractors would be free to demand
other considerations from subcontractors and obtain additional
protection, but these provisions would be listed separately
from the standard terms and conditions. Furthermore, subcon-
tractors would be requested to submit two bids on each proposal
One based only on the requirements and risks applied by the
standard set of terms and conditions and the other priced to
include any additional requirements levied by the prime con-
tractor for his own benefit. This procedure appears to have
many benefits. First, subcontractors would save an inordinate
amount of time by not having to examine each clause to see how
the prime contractor's demands differ from Government require-
ments. Second, it will be more difficult for prime contrac-
tors to disguise risk shifts because prime contractor require-
ments, above and beyond those necessary for the Government,
will be clearly delineated and can be worked out at the nego-
tiation table. This will help the smaller subcontractor who
may not have the resources of an experienced contract admin^
istrator or lawyer. Finally, Government acquisition officials
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will be able to see the costs of additional prime contractor
requirements placed on subcontractors and will be better able
to deny costs which provide no additional benefits for the
Government
.
As might be expected, subcontractors with ample
leverage, market dominance, or in a sole source position saw
no need for further Government involvement nor intervention
since they were able to effectively negotiate terms and con-
ditions with prime contractors which they perceived as fair
and equitable to both parties.
Prime contractors envisioned this entire exercise as
fruitless and a waste of time as they contend "overreach' does
not occur, at least within their organization. Even when pre-
sented their own set of subcontractor terms and conditions
where the changes clause, for example, had been expanded to
cover quantities, their response was that they had never
exercised that right.
The second pertinent question, proposed earlier, asked
what can or should the Government do to rectify unfair prac-
tices or inequitable risks forced on subcontractors by prime
contractors. With respect to what can the Government do,
interviewees answered that the Government can basically do
anything it wants. Past history certainly demonstrates the
Government has not hesitated to interfere with prime contrac-
tor - subcontractor relationships when Government interests
were at stake or Government requirements, with respect to sub-
contractor efforts, were necessary. However, the concensus
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of Government acquisition interviewees, with regard to what
should be done concerning overreach, was virtually unanimous -
nothing! First, Government acquisition officials did not
perceive the problem of overreach as being detrimental to
the subcontracting base and therefore the Federal acquisition
process. They contended that they knew of no prime contrac-
tors experiencing difficulty in obtaining an ample number of
subcontracts for Government programs, they had received few
complaints from subcontractors as to prime contractor abuse,
and they did not perceive a mass exodus of subcontractors from
the Government acquisition arena due to unfair distribution
of risk, inequitable procurement practices, or detrimental
terms and conditions. Second, Government acquisition offi-
cials stated the Government should not interfere where they
had no"privity of contract. The sharing of risks and the
determination of terms and conditions was strictly between the
parties involved and any Government intervention would result
in additional outcries from private industry. Third, it was
felt that current procedures, such as consent to subcontracts
and CPSR, along with surveillance of prime contractor manage-
ment of subcontractors, was sufficient to detect any procure-
ment procedures on the part of prime contractors that may
be detrimental to subcontractors and subsequently to the
Federal acquisition process. Finally, some Government per-
sonnel felt that the tougher prime contractors dealt with




While these views were virtually unanimous, one or
two minority views were also expressed. Certain interviewees^
while expressing that relations between prime contractors and
subcontractors should be of no concern to the Government, alluded
to possible indirect consequences arising for the Federal
acquisition process due to overreach. First, prime contrac-
tor procurement practices which favor one subcontractor over
another may result in failure to select the best subcontractor
when all criteria for award are considered. Second, as alluded
to by Mr. Singer, "overreach" wastes contractor time and
effort which might be better spent on performance and adds
additional cost for benefits primarily received by prime con-
tractors; not the Government. Third, prime contractor 'over-
reach, which forces a subcontractor to accept risks and pro-
visions he later learns he cannot handle or acomplish, may
result in subcontractor failure. Such failure could result
in program delays, cost growth, and administrative problems
for all concerned. Fourth, the forcing of more risk than that
assumed to be fair and equitable may create animosity between
two crucial players within the Government acquisition process
which may hinder the cooperative spirit and sense of teamwork
necessary for successful program accomplishment. Finally, the
Government attempts to determine what is fair and equitable
with regard to the sharing of risks with prime contractors
during the negotiating phase. The fact that a prime contractor
further dilutes his risks with subcontractors, over which the
Government does not enjoy a direct legal relationship, may
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result in more risks accruing to the Government than initially
agreed upon, particularly if a prime contractor miscalculates
the degree of risk a subcontractor can or is willing to assume.
It should also be noted that precedent has been estab-
lished for Government concern and possible intervention with
regard to 1 'overreach7 in the past. The DOD acquisition offi-
cials stated that in the 1973-1974 time period many prime con-
tractors had obtained production options from most major
subcontractors with prices based on a 3% to 4% inflation rate.
During this period, inflation jumped as high as 10% to 12%.
Many subcontractors voiced concern over the fact that prime
contractors would not relax their obligation or renegotiate
new option provisions. Many subcontractors stated that forcing
them to honor such options would cause serious financial diffi-
culties and possibly force them out of business. The DOD
informally discussed this matter with several prime contractors
and eventually most, if not all, subcontractors were able to
renegotiate their options. In 1978, DOD tasked the Logistics
Management Institute (LMI) to conduct a study designed to
assess the affect of subcontracting precepts and practices
held by prime contractors on major systems acquisition and to
recommend requirements DOD could adopt in governing the appli-
cation of prime contract provisions to associated subcontrac-
tors [25] . While this study concluded that no major problems
existed in this area, and no further Government intervention
was deemed necessary, studies such as this, along with Govern-
ment actions of the mid-seventies, serves to indicate some
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degree of concern regarding "overreach". Some Government
acquisition officials apparently do realize that unfair and
inequitable practices between prime contractors and sub-
contractors have at least the potential for negatively
effecting the Federal acquisition process and have acted
accordingly.
2 . Subcontractor Remedies
Another major area worthy of analysis, with regard
to Government - prime contractor - subcontractor relation-
ships, involves the nature and adequacy of subcontractor
remedies with respect to Government actions or inactions.
DOD prime contractors, operating under "privity of contract"
with the Government, are afforded both administrative and
judicial remedies if (1) it is felt Government actions are
unfair or inequitable, (2) the Government has failed to
fulfill contractual responsibilities, or (3) Government
actions or inactions result in increased costs not antici-
pated during the initial negotiations of the contract.
For example, under the Tucker Act of 1887, the Government
as a sovereign, has agreed to be sued for breach of con-
tract by those with whom an express or implied contract has
been established [29; p. 747] . Furthermore, the Comptroller
General has statutory authority to settle and adjust claims
against the United States, but again only with those
enjoying privity of contract with the Government [29,
p. 748] . Finally, prime contractors are able to utilize
the Disputes Clause which provides that all questions of
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/fact arising out of the contract are to be decided by the
Contracting Officer, subject to the Contractor's right of
appeal. The contractor may appeal decisions of the
Contracting Officer either to the Armed Services Board of
Contract Appeals (ASBCA) or the Federal Court system.
Some of the more common situations in which this benefit
serves to protect the rights and interests of the prime
contractor include but are not limited to the following
[32, p. K-l-24.6]
:
1. Changes Clause; equitable adjustments;
2. Inspection Clause, acceptance of items and
reduced prices for those items which do not meet
specifications
;
3. Default Clause, whether or not the contractor is
in default or there is excusable delay;
4. Termination Clause, amount of settlement and the
many complex problems regarding the disposal of
termination inventory;
5. Government-Furnished Property Clause, equitable
adjustments for failure to deliver acceptable
property in a timely fashion or for decreases in
the amount of the property furnished;
6. Amount of price revision under redetermination and
incentive type contracts;
7. Amount of escalation under an escalation clause for
material and labor.
8. Allowable Cost Fixed Fee and Payment Article;
9. Excusable Delays.
When these clauses are used in the prime contract
y
they either specifically provide for a contractor's right
of appeal or his right of appeal is established by the
Disputes clause which applies to all questions of fact
arising from the contract. As a further illustration of
this provision, consider the Changes Clause which allows
the Government to make certain unilateral changes to the
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contract. The Government and prime contractor attempt to
reach agreement as to an equitable adjustment for performing
the change. If agreement is possible, the Contracting
Officer may unilaterally decide what constitutes an equi-
table adjustment under the Disputes Clause. If the prime
contractor is still not satisfied, he may appeal the deci-
sion to either the ASBCA or Federal Court system.
With regard to subcontractors, Government - prime
contractor - subcontractor relations preclude the establish-
ment of privity of contract between the Government and sub-
contractors as outlined in Chapter IV. The lack of
privity, therefore, effectively bars subcontractors from
bringing suit against the Government in either District
Courts or the Court of Claims or before the Comptroller
General. Furthermore, subcontractors are denied the benefit
of the Disputes Clause as it is designed for the benefit of
prime contractors alone, and the ASBCA has no authority to
consider a subcontractor's direct appeal unless such
authority is expressly provided for in the prime or sub-
contract [32; p. K-126] . The standard Disputes Clause
contains no such provision and, within DOD, contracting
officers are specifically prohibited from approving any
subcontract disputes clause which grants a subcontractor
direct right to obtain a decision from the Contracting
Officer or ASBCA [10; 23-203] . Therefore, when clauses
are flowed down to subcontractors, either as mandatory or
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self-protection clauses, any which provide for specific
appeal rights, or to which the standard Disputes Clause
is applicable under prime contracts, are altered to delete
the appeal provisions. While prime contractors may still
alter, change, or make determinations with regard to sub-
contractors, any disputes or disagreements which arise are
strictly between the prime contractor and subcontractor,
even though Government action or inaction may have initiated
the entire chain of events.
With the avenues of direct relief as a result of
Government action or inaction effectively blocked, sub-
contractors have been forced to find other means of obtaining
relief from the Government. The primary recourse available
to subcontractors has been to persuade prime contractors
to bring suit on their behalf or seek the prime contractor's
permission to bring suit in his name. Any costs recovered
by the prime contractor would then be provided to the sub-
contractor. According to Professor Whelan, this procedure,
referred to as the "good shepherd" approach, has been given
general approval by the Government and ASBCA for many
years [51; p. 6.88]. This approach may also be used in
cases where a prime contractor appeals on behalf of sub-
contractor under the Disputes Clause contained in the
prime contractor's contract with the Government. Instead
of seeking relief from the Government, a subcontractor may
also sue the prime contractor under their legal arrangement
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and the UCC but this results in a subcontractor sacrificing
the speed and informality of administrative proceedings,
and may be inequitable to the prime contractor since the
Government may really be the party at fault. This would be
particularly true in those instances where a subcontractor
was awarded more money from the prime contractor through
arbitration or the judicial process than the prime contrac-
tor was able to receive from the Government in which case
the prime would be forced to make up the difference.
Discussions with subcontractors by this researcher also
indicated a reluctance to bring suit against prime contrac-
tors because the cost of litigation often exceeded the
settlement and suits against prime contractors may result
in reduced chances for future subcontracts from that
particular prime contractor.
If legal proceedings by subcontractors against
prime contractors for Government acts or omissions appear
unappealing, at least to some subcontractors, the "good
shepherd" appraoch also has its drawbacks. First, a prime
contractor may refuse to act as a good shepherd. As an
example, in a majority of cost-type subcontracts, prime
contractors insist on a provision that in the event of a
subcontractor claim, a subcontractor will only receive
that amount of money which the Contracting Officer agrees
to reimburse the prime contractor for his services [32;
p. K-l-27] . With this type of provision, the prime
contractor has little incentive or interest in processing
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a subcontractor's appeal since the prime is legally entitled
to simply take the money awarded by the Contracting Officer
and provide it to the subcontractor. The prime contractor
has lost nothing and the subcontractor has no further legal
recourse. Second, any prime contractor who is reluctant
to appeal on his own behalf, due possibly to fear of
jeopardizing his chances for future awards or fear of
earning the reputation of being difficult to get along
with, is even less likely to allow his name to be used by a
subcontractor in forwarding an indirect appeal. Third, a
prime contractor may consider the size of a subcontractor's
claim relatively small in relation to the total prime
contract and not worth the effort even though the size of
the claim may be considered substantial and very important
to the subcontractor. Fourth, a prime contractor may act
without diligence so that its own position as a litigant
is denied due to failure to comply with certain appeal
provisions contained within the Disputes Clause. A classic
example of this occurred in the Blount Brothers Case [4]
.
In this case the prime contractor, Blount Brothers Corp.,
received claims from two subcontractors for $35,000 for
work performed relating to change orders. The subcontrac-
tors in this situation were bound by their relationship
with the prime contractor to abide by the outcome of any
resolution of disputes between the prime contractor and
Government under the standard Disputes Clause. On
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June 9, 1978, the Contracting Officer made a final decision
to deny the claim of Blount Brothers on behalf of the
subcontractors. It was not until July 18, 1978 that Blount
Brothers appealed the Contracting Officer's decision. This
appeal was declared untimely, as it exceeded the 30 days
allotted to file an appeal, and was subsequently denied.
However, on June 27, 1978 one of the subcontractors filed
an appeal directly to the Contracting Officer. It too was
denied since it was in the subcontractor's name, and with-
out 'privity of contract7' between the subcontractor and the
Government, the Appeals Board had no jurisdiction. Had
the June 22nd letter emanated from Blount Brothers it would
have been timely and the appeal considered. In this case,
the subcontractors in question were left virtually helpless
and $35,000 poorer. The provision within the subcontract
forced them to comply with the Government's decision, while
the prime contractor's lack of diligence precluded their
indirect right of appeal and any hope of receiving their
monies. While it is conceivable the subcontractors in this
instance may have had grounds on which to sue the prime
contractor for negligence, the point remains that sub-
contractors are often forced to rely on another party, who
may not possess the same high degree of interest in
achieving legal remedies, when attempting to seek justice
and equitable treatment under Government contracts.
Finally, and possibly the most severely limiting element
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precluding subcontractor relief under the "Good Shepherd"
approach, involves the so-called Severin Doctrine [37]
.
The Severin Doctrine originated from a case in which suit
was brought against the Government by a prime contractor
both for himself and a subcontractor as a result of
Government delays. Within the subcontract was an exculpa-
tory clause which stated the prime contractor would not be
liable for any loss, damage, detention or delay caused by
the owner - in this case the Government. The Court of
Claims held that while the prime contractor was entitled
to recover damages, the subcontractor could not because the
prime contractor must show he had paid damages due a sub-
contractor or was liable for damages claimed by a sub-
contractor. In this case, the exculpatory clause released
the prime contractor from any liability with respect to his
subcontractor. The subcontractor could not appeal directly
to the Government as he lacked "privity of contract and was
therefore left without a remedy. Under the Severin Doctrine/
any prime contractor who brings suit on behalf of a sub-
contractor, or appeals a Contracting Officer's decision on
behalf of a subcontractor under the Disputes Clause, must
establish a basis for his suit against the Government. A
prime contractor must be liable for damages to a sub-
contractor before he may appeal or bring suit on behalf of
the injured subcontractor. Any exculpatory clause contained
in the subcontract may block a prime contractor from seeking
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remedies on behalf of a subcontractor even though the
prime contractor is willing to advance such an action.
Fortunately, the harshness of the Sever in rule has been
mitigated by subsequent Court of Claims decisions which,
for example, have allowed a prime contractor to seek remedies
on behalf of subcontractors when the subcontract is silent
as to the ultimate liability of the prime contractor. In
another instance, the Court of Claims examined an exculpa-
tory clause in a subcontract and found it was designed to
insulate the prime contractor only in those cases where
Government acts or omissions caused damages not recoverable
short of a breach of contract suit. The court found that
the exculpatory clause did not apply to those situations
where the prime contract itself specifically provides for
compensation from Government acts or omissions, such as
changes or delays. In this case, since the subcontractor's
claims concerned areas where the Government specifically
provided compensation for Government actions it was ruled
the exculpatory clause and Severin rule did not bar a prime
contractor from seeking remedies on behalf of an injured
subcontractor. It should also be noted that the ASBCA has
basically followed the lead of the Court of Claims when
deciding whether the Severin Doctrine is applicable or not.
Regardless of the subsequent mitigation of the initial
Severin ruling, the real point is that even where a prime
contractor agrees to seek remedies on behalf of a
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subcontractor there is no guarantee that either the Federal
Courts or ASBCA will have jurisdiction. Each subcontract
must be looked at individually to see if exculpatory clauses
may preclude appeals to Federal authorities. While a simple
solution might be to advise subcontractors not to accept any
type or form of exculpatory clause from prime contractors,
this ability depends once again on relative bargaining
strength when the subcontract is formulated. The key ques-
tion becomes, should the ability of subcontractors to seek
remedies for alleged damages be based upon their negotiating
strength or should the privilege of redress of grievances
be equitably afforded to all parties involved?
There is yet another interesting facet to the
subject of subcontractor remedies. While many subcontrac-
tors resort to the "good shepherd" approach, as it is their
only viable recourse, some interviewees stated that sub-
contractors may be able to take a more expedient approach -
blackmail! Consider the following example. The Government
directs a unilateral change which affects only the component
being designed and developed by a subcontractor. The
Government and prime contractor agree on an equitable
adjustment but the subcontractor does not agree that the
amount is equitable. The prime contractor refuses to appeal
the Government's decision as a "good shepherd" for one of
the reasons mentioned previously. The subcontractor feels
a commercial suit is too expensive, time consuming, and not
worth the effort. The subcontractor decides simply to stop
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performing until agreement is reached. While this dispute
is basically between the prime contractor and subcontractor,
the Government also loses in this scenario. In stopping
performance, the subcontractor may seriously impair meeting
the delivery schedule, costs rise for the prime contractor
which may ultimately be paid by the Government, and the
entire benefit of harmonious relationships between contrac-
tors may be destroyed. Had there been a provision in the
subcontract allowing the subcontractor some type of appeal
route to the Government, along with a requirement to con-
tinue performance, as is the case with prime contractors,
this situation may have been avoided. While it is recog-
nized that the subcontractor risks legal action by the
prime contractor, along with jeopardizing his chances for
future awards, it was alleged during interviews that this
practice continues to occur and that just the threat of
such action may be a powerful weapon for subcontractors.
Again, however, the ability of any subcontractor to success-
fully employ this tactic depends on negotiating strength
and the relative importance of the subcontractor to the
prime contractor's efforts. Perhpas the greatest revelation
emanating from the alleged use of blackmail is the potential
for disruption and chaos within the acquisition process when
subcontractors opt, or are forced, to resort to such tactics
due to the lack of any perceived viable alternatives and the
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apparent lack of any contract provision requiring continued
performance during the resolution of disputes.
In researching the problem of apparent inequities
regarding subcontractor remedies it was often suggested by
the literature that subcontractors be allowed direct appeal
rights to Government authorities, the same as prime con-
tractors currently receive.
In discussing the feasibility of direct subcontrac-
tor appeals, most Government acquisition officials expressed
a variety of concerns regarding this procedure. Many felt
any disputes raised by subcontractors should be handled
entirely between the prime contractor and subcontractor.
The prime contractor is paid to manage his subcontractors
and the resolution of disputes falls within this management
function. Other arguments included the lack of "privity°
concept whereby subcontractors without privity" have no
judicial recourse against the Government and therefore no
basis for appeal. While this is true regarding direct sub-
contractor suits against the Government for breach of
contract, the wall of privity can be broken down in the
area of administrative appeals under the Disputes Clause.
As previously discussed, direct appeal by subcontractors
may be allowed if a Contracting Officer is authorized to
consent to a subcontract disputes clause which allows direct
subcontractor appeals. While DOD regulations prevent consent
in these situations, the Department of Energy (DOE) does
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allow subcontractors direct appeal to their administrative
appeal board. In this situation, a subcontractor obtains at
least a certain degree of recourse from Government acts or
omissions even if still precluded from directly suing the
Government for breach of contract. Government officials
also argued that granting subcontractors a direct right of
appeal would place the Government in the position of an
arbitrator in those disputes primarily between the prime
contractor and subcontractors and that increased appeals
would inundate the ASBCA with an unacceptable workload. On
the other hand, a National Security Industrial Association
(NSIA) workshop, conducted by NSIA legal and special tasks
subcommittee, contends that such arguments fail to adequately
draw a distinction between disputes that are primarily
between the prime contractor and subcontractor and those
that are, in theory between the prime and subcontractor,
but that are actually between the Government and the sub-
contractor [28/ p. 65] . The NSIA further suggested the
following situations where Government actions may result
in disputes actually between the Government and subcontrac-
tors, or at least impact on subcontractors as much if not
more than the prime contractor, and therefore may lend
themselves to the granting of an expansion of subcontractor
remedies [28; p. 6]:
1. Subcontractor Defective Pricing Data Problems.
2. Disallowance of items of cost included in subcon-
tractor's overhead and other loading rates.
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3. Disallowances of costs on cost reimbursement
subcontracts, or incentives on cost plus incentive
fee subcontracts.
4. And generally, any situation in which the same
issue exists between the Government and the prime
contractor and between the prime contractor and the
subcontractor
.
As for overly burdening the ASBCA, while this possibility
exists, any changes in present subcontractor remedies could
be instituted on a trial basis so as to measure the increased
workload, if any, prior to any final conclusive action.
Finally, Government officials expressed concern that granting
direct appeal rights to subcontractors may result in end
runs by subcontractors to the Government without attempting
to first settle with prime contractors. Furthermore, the
possibility exists that both the Government and a prime
contractor may settle a subcontractor's claim and the
Government might then be called upon to reimburse the prime
contractor for the payment of the same claim. One possible
compromise, which appears to avoid some of the arguments
against direct subcontractor appeals, involves a disputes
clause already being used by certain prime contractors in
their subcontracts. Under this clause, subcontractors,
while not granted direct appeal rights, may indirectly
appeal a Government decision when the same issue exists
between the prime contractor and the subcontractor and
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between the prime contractor and Government, and where the
prime contractor chooses not to appeal the decision. In
other words, the prime contractor is actually guaranteeing
his role as a "good shepherd". Currently, in many sub-
contracts, while the prime contractor may appeal on behalf
of a subcontractor, he is not legally or contractually
obligated to do so. In addition, all parties accepting this
clause would be bound by any decision emanating from the
appellate process under the Government Disputes Clause.
Furthermore, while the appeal is in process, performance
would continue. A sample of this clause is contained in
Appendix B.
Most prime contractors interviewed contended that
they saw little need for any changes involving subcontractor
remedies as they stood ready and willing to allow subcon-
tractors to appeal to Government authorities under the "good
shepherd" approach. However, when queried as to guarantee-
ing a subcontractor's right of appeal under the prime's name
or under the prime contract, some expressed reservations
that such a provision would limit a prime contractor's
flexibility in handling disputes and disagreements involving
its subcontractors.
Subcontractors had mixed emotions regarding this
issue. While most agreed that the present situation can
be inequitable for subcontractors, and that on occasion
they have settled for less than what they considered an
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optimal adjustment due to lack of alternative courses of
action, subcontractors expressed concern for any remedy
which excluded the prime contractors entirely. Subcon-
tractors would prefer to let prime contractors settle
disputes involving Government actions for them. However,
in situations where the prime contractor refused to accept
this role, most subcontractors did favor the right of
appeal under the Disputes Clause. Not all subcontractors,
however, favored a disputes clause in their contracts with
prime contractors because it would contain the requirement
to continue performance pending resolution of the conflict.
This appears to lend credence to the practice, or at least
the threat, of blackmail as a means of forcing prime con-
tractors to provide adjustments more favorable to sub-
contractors. In those situations where disputes were solely
between the prime contractor and a subcontractor, subcon-
tractors, prime contractors, and government officials all
felt the Government should not intervene, force arbitration
on the parties, or otherwise dictate the method by which
such disputes would be settled.
E . SUMMARY
In summary, problems and difficulties, seemingly inherent
within Government - prime contractor - subcontractor rela-
tionships, have been identified and addressed. These
problems, along with previously proposed solutions, appear
extremely controversial and affect all three key participants
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The Government experiences difficulties in attempting to
identify and implement the type and degree of involvement
deemed appropriate to effectively monitor and control the
efforts of subcontractors, with whom a legal basis for
such action has not been established. Prime contractors,
conversely, experience problems with their flexibility and
management effectiveness when Government involvement
exceeds what they deem to be reasonable and prudent.
Subcontractors, on the other hand, must contend with prime
contractor "overreach" when prime contractors are tasked
with protecting the Government's interests and fostering
Government procurement policy. Furthermore, while Govern-
ment acts or omissions may impact dramatically on sub-
contractors, they may be denied basic appellate benefits
due to their nebulous and ill defined position with respect
to the Government, as opposed to the relative merits and
validity of their grievances.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
1. The role and importance of subcontractors in the
Federal acquisition process has changed dramatically over
the past thirty to forty years, particularly in the field
of weapons system acquisition. As technology has advanced
and defense requirements continued to demand sophisticated,
highly complex, and multi-purpose weapons systems, prime
contractors can no longer hope to possess the multitude of
skills, plant and equipment, and resources necessary to
develop total weapons systems completely in house. Sub-
contractors have filled the void through specialization
with respect to the design and development of critical
components thereby enhancing their role and importance
within the weapons acquisition process. Furthermore, as
technology continues to advance and weapons systems become
increasingly complicated this trend appears likely to
continue.
2. The proper selection, performance, and management
of major critical subcontractors has a definite impact on
the success or failure of a major weapons system and there-
fore on the Federal acquisition process itself. As sub-
contractors assume an ever increasingly important role in
the design, development, and production of key weapons
system components their inability to perform, or substandard
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performance, due to lack of facilities and capabilities,
poor management of subcontractor efforts, or difficulties
in successfully integrating complex components may result
in program delays, cost growth, and substandard products
ultimately delivered to the Government.
3. The Government's present policy of using an inte-
grating weapons system contractor who, at least in theory,
is charged with the responsibility for subcontract selection,
performance and management and who assumes the risks of
successful component integration is basically sound and
logical. Given the sheer numbers of subcontractors who
participate in the design and development of today's weapon
systems, the Government simply does not possess the resources
to effectively establish, maintain and monitor contractual
relations with each or coordinate the technologically complex
process of integrating all components into an effectively
functioning final product. The only viable recourse is to
utilize and pay prime contractors to assume these functions
with the Government monitoring the actions of the prime
contractor to ensure Government interests are protected and
Government acquisition objectives effectively fostered.
Additionally, this method places the risk of poor or unac-
ceptable subcontractor performance on the prime contractor,
as opposed to the Government, as would be the case if the




4. While present Government policy regarding the
handling of subcontractors is basically sound and logical,
the Government, in attempting to protect and foster its
interests, has effectively created a complicated series of
relationships involving both prime contractors and sub-
contractors. This has in turn resulted in a great deal of
Government control over the selection, performance and
management of subcontractors even though no direct contrac-
tual authority for such rights exists. Through the use of
mandatory flow-down clauses contained in the prime contract,
the Government forces subcontractors to abide by a variety
of Government rules, regulations and procedures if they wish
to participate in Government funded programs. Furthermore,
by placing contractual obligations on prime contractors,
which can only be guaranteed if equally applicable to sub-
contractors, the Government forces prime contractors to
include self-protection clauses in subcontracts which
further advance Government rights and requirements with
regard to subcontractors.
5. In establishing Government - prime contractor -
subcontractor relationships the Government has created an
apparent one way street with regard to subcontractors. The
Government has found numerous ways to apply Government rights
and requirements to subcontractors without establishing a
direct legal relationship. However, the lack of such a
relationship - 'privity of contract' - precludes subcontractors
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from achieving direct legal remedies against the Government
when Government acts or omissions impact directly on sub-
contractors. Subcontractor alternatives consist of either
a commercial suit against the prime contractor or asking
the prime contractor to appeal to Government authorities on
their behalf. The former alternative is usually not selected
since the time and expense of a commercial suit often fails
to justify the judgment and may preclude further awards.
The latter alternative will work only if the prime contractor
consents to such an appeal and Federal judicial and admini-
strative bodies conclude they have jurisdiction under the
Severin Doctrine.
6. Prime contractors, in following Government require-
ments to flow down clauses designed to protect Government
interest and in developing clauses which limit their own
liability have been accused of what may be termed prime
contractor "overreach." "Overreach" can best be described
as the process whereby prime contractors do not always
follow prescribed Government procurement practices in the
selection of subcontractors as well as attempting to pass
more risks and fewer benefits to lower-tier contractors.
The Government appears to inadvertentaly contribute to this
scenario by its failure to prescribe to prime contractors
a standard set of terms and conditions which it specifically
desires within any given subcontract. This allows prime





and to the detriment of subcontractors while
still fulfilling Government requirements.
7. Current Government acquisition tools and procedures
designed to ensure prime contractors follow prescribed pro-
curement procedures in the evaluation and selection of
subcontractors, such as the requirement for Contracting
Officers to consent to certain subcontracts and CPSR's, may
not be as effective as originally thought or envisioned.
Research interviews indicate that the consent process may
be merely a rubber stamp procedure in some cases and in
other cases was not conducted in the in-depth manner pre-
scribed by Government acquisition regulations. It was
further contended that the effectiveness of contractor
procurement system reviews have been diminished by personnel
shortages within Contract Administration Offices resulting
in fewer personnel devoting less time to CPSR's and less
thorough and accurate evaluations of a prime contractor's
procurement system and practices. Furthermore, the raising
of the dollar threshold of Government contracts, above which
CPSR's are conducted, has resulted in fewer firms being
subject to the review and the more opportunity for undesir-
able and inequitable procurement practices.
8. While the effects of prime contractor "overreach"
appear unfair and inequitable, at least for certain sub-
contractors, the long term effects of this practice on the
entire subcontractor base and Federal acquisition process
is uncertain at best. Subcontractors admit they have lost
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money due to acceptance of greater risks than deemed appro-
priate. Personal interviews and the COGP report indicate
subcontractor unhappiness with the current state of affairs.
There does exist a tendency for subcontractors to mitigate
Government risks through diversification to commercial
ventures, which serves to reduce capacity for Government
projects. However, Government and prime contractor personnel
perceive no shortages of subcontractors willing to partici-
pate in Government projects and appear unconcerned as to
subcontractor problems. What does appear certain, however,
is that unfair and inequitable treatment of subcontractors,
inadequate assessment of subcontractor risks and the rapidly
changing economic environment has the potential to negatively
effect the subcontractor as previously evidenced during the
1973-1974 inflationary period. Therefore, actions designed
to mitigate current inequities and better monitor the
practices of "overreach" to prevent future problems appear
prudent, farsighted, and appropriate.
9. While Government officials and prime contractors
have basically expressed satisfaction with Government -
prime contractor - subcontractor relations, problems exist
for these principals as well as for subcontractors. The
Government, in its attempts to have few if any dealings with
subcontractors, so as not to inadvertently shift risks from
prime contractors, is faced with a dilemma. The Government
must walk a tightrope between allowing prime contractors
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the freedom and flexibility necessary to effectively guide
and control subcontractors, while at the same time, attempt
to monitor and incentivize prime contractor and subcontractor
efforts to ensure Government interests are fostered and
public funds judiciously expended. While some degree of
Government involvement in this regard appears inevitable,
controversy surrounds the question of how much involvement
and in what form, is most effective, efficient and bene-
ficial to all parties concerned. The situation is further
complicated by a lack of DOD-wide policy and guidance as
to the degree of involvement, the tools best suited for the
task, and the organizational structure desired. This has
resulted in a fragmented and divergent series of approaches
to the problem by individual DOD components and CAO ' s
.
Prime contractors also experience problems with present
relationships when Government personnel, attempting to
monitor the prime -subcontractor relationship, exceed their
authority and actually attempt to dictate the prime con-
tractor's management of a subcontractor, or worse yet,
attempt to directly manage a subcontractor. Not only do
such actions tend to relieve prime contractors of the risks
of subcontracting, so zealously avoided by the Government,
but serves to create adversity and ill-will between industry





While it does not appear that problems inherent with
Government - prime contractor - subcontractor relationships
warrant revolutionary changes to the acquisition process
itself, the following recommendations are offered in hopes
of further enhancing the effectiveness of Government -
prime contractor - subcontractor relationships, and their
impact on the Federal acquisition process, as well as
precluding potentially deleterious problems in future
weapons systems acquisition.
1. Continued emphasis should be placed on award fee
type contracts, particularly in the early stages of weapons
design and development, as a means of incentivizing prime
contractors to foster and protect Government interests
regarding subcontractors and to encourage enhanced manage-
ment of subcontractors. For example, the creation of a
special subcontractor award fee category would hopefully
serve two purposes. First, the amount of fee payable could
be based on the prime contractor's use of prescribed procure-
ment practices as well as how equitably a prime contractor
shares risks and benefits with his subcontractors. This
would help control and mitigate the effects of "overreach."
Second, by incentivizing prime contractors to better manage
subcontractors, Government requirements for monitoring and
surveillance functions with respect to subcontractors would
be reduced resulting in disengagement, reduced administra-
tive costs, and happier prime contractors.
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2. DOD level policy organizations should become more
involved in the question of subcontract management and at
least attempt to determine the degree of involvement,
personnel resources required, and organizational approach
deemed optional at varying stages of the weapons acquisi-
tion process for the effective and efficient monitoring of
the prime contractor - subcontractor relationship. Uniform
application of DOD-wide policy and guidance regarding sub-
contract management would greatly assist Program Managers,
Contracting Officers and CAO ' s in determining (1) how best
to manage subcontractors, (2) what aspects of the prime
contractor - subcontractor relationship are most critical
to the fostering of Government interests and requirements,
and (3) how to avoid inadvertently shifting risks from prime
contractors to the Government when dealing with subcon-
tractors. It may even be feasible and desirable to create
a model whereby the methodologies, personnel resources and
organizational structure utilized in subcontract management
would vary depending on such factors as type of contract,
phase of the weapons acquisition process, history and
reputation of subcontractors involved, and the past perform-
ance of the prime contractor with respect to subcontract
management.
3. Renewed emphasis should be placed on the requirement
to consent to subcontracts in accordance with established
criteria in DAR. It is imperative that subcontracts
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requiring consent be thoroughly examined and that those
contracts not meeting the specified criteria not be approved
pending prime contractor revisions. In addition
, to avoid
an independent study by the General Accounting Office (GAO)
,
which may be critical with regard to present practices, it
is recommended that procuring agencies examine and validate
the thoroughness and diligence being exercised by
Contracting Officers in the field regarding the consent
process.
4. Additional resources should be applied to the CPSR
program as well as lowering the current threshold to
encompass more, not less, of the major prime contractors
who are subsequently charged with the selection and award
of subcontracts. Through increased efforts and thoroughness
of CPSR's, procurement practices detrimental to subcontrac-
tors can be more easily identified and action taken to
rectify the situation, thereby mitigating the effects of
"overreach" and precluding possible negative effects on
subcontractors and the subcontractor base. One added bene-
fit of expanding CPSR's would be a greater potential for
Government disengagement from prime contractor operations.
5. Government acquisition officials, working in con-
junction with industry officials, should formulate a standard
set of terms and conditions which would apply to subcontrac-
tors. These terms and conditions would encompass all
required Government flow-down provisions, as well as those
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terms and conditions necessary for prime contractors to
comply with Government obligations originating in the prime
contract. While prime contractors would be allowed to seek
further terms and conditions from subcontractors, a clear
distinction would exist between those terms and conditions
necessary due to Government acquisition and those designed
to provide prime contractors an extra margin of safety and
protection in the performance of their prime contracts.
Furthermore/ prime contractors could no longer subtley
alter Government clauses when passing them along to sub-
contractors due to nebulous language, meaning, or misinter-
pretation since the terms and conditions would be
explicitly stated, flowed-down verbatum, and would be
applicable to all prime contractors who award subcontracts.
6. With respect to subcontractor remedies, it is
recommended the Government require prime contractors
to utilize a disputes clause in their subcontracts patterned
after the NSIA clause included in Appendix B. The use of
such a clause would allow prime contractors the opportunity
to appeal Government decisions on behalf of subcontractors.
However, it also guarantees a subcontractor all rights
provided the prime contractor by the Government in the event
the prime contractor chooses not to appeal on behalf of an
injured subcontractor. Essentially, this clause guarantees
subcontractors additional avenues for relief, aside from
commercial suits or threats of blackmail, while stopping
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short of allowing subcontractors to appeal directly to the
Government and circumventing the prime contractor. Addi-
tionally, this clause (1) appears to supersede any excul-
patory provisions or other clauses which seek to limit prime
contractor liability to subcontractors, (2) is in keeping
with current DOD policy which allows Contracting Officers
to consent to subcontracts containing indirect appeal
rights for subcontractors/ and (3) provides that performance
shall continue pending resolution of the dispute. As the
Government has already tacitly agreed to indirect appeals
by subcontractors, via the prime contractor, the mandatory
inclusion of this clause represents little change for the
Government but a large step forward in attempting to equate
subcontractor rights and benefits with obligations and
requirements currently imposed by the Federal acquisition
process. Finally, this clause would only be applicable
to those situations where Government acts or omissions
directly affect the subcontractor and not in disputes solely
betewen the prime contractor and a subcontractor.
7. Ongoing personnel exchange programs between Govern-
ment and industry, such as those currently implemented
within the Air Force, should be expanded to encompass key
acquisition personnel within all DOD components as well as
solicit additional participation from industry acquisition
officials. It is felt such programs tend to reduce the
< adversarial nature at times prevalent between Government
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and industry by creating a better understanding and appre-
ciation of each other's duties , responsibilities, and
rights within the Federal acquisition environment. In
addition, such programs serve to enhance training and
orientation with respect to the Government - prime contractor
subcontractor relations outlined in this effort and appear
particularly beneficial to Program Managers, Contracting
Officers, and field administrative personnel intimately
involved in the Government - prime contractor - subcontractor
f scenario. It is therefore proposed that DOD, in conjunction
with major defense contractors and subcontractors, identify
personnel who stand to benefit from the opportunities
afforded by additional exchange programs and initiate
action to exchange personnel for periods ranging from six
to twelve months.
It may also be appropriate at this point to suggest an
area deserving of further study. This involves the question
and impact of prime contractor "overreach". It is apparent
prime contractor "overreach" is attempted and has caused
problems in the past as evidenced by subcontractor experi-
ences in the 1973-1974 inflationary period when committed
to unrealistically priced option clauses. Furthermore,
some degree of Government concern, as to whether prime
contractors attempt to fairly and equitably share risk and
foster proper procurement percepts with regard to sub-
contractors, is evidenced by the recent LMI study entitled
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"Subcontracting Policy in Major System Acquisition" [25]
.
Unfortunately, both the sample size of the LMI study as well
as this research effort, were limited and therefore defini-
tive conclusions regarding "overreach" are difficult to
draw. In addition, while the LMI study concluded "over-
reach" basically did not occur, or occurred only in isolated
instances, this appears counter to the views expressed by
the COGP and the thoughts of interviewees during this
research. Due largely to this apparent divergence of
opinion, and the fact that "overreach" has the potential to
weaken and undermine the subcontractor base, a stronger
feeling for the degree and impact of "overreach" would
better serve Government acquisition personnel in any attempt
designed to improve overall weapon system acquisition
effectiveness and efficiency.
C . SUMMARY
In summary, while this effort admittedly tackled a
broad subject area and was limited by the sample size of
personal interviews, the researcher is hopeful that some
light has been shed on Government - prime contractor -
subcontractor relationships, their impact on the Federal
acquistion process, and inherent problems caused by these
relationships. Difficulties, such as those posed for the
Government in attempting to monitor and control subcontrac-
tors while denying them privity of contract, prime
contractor frustration and animosity due to over zealous
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Government managers, and subcontractor problems of "over-
reach" and lack of totally effective recourse in light of
Government acts or omissions^ all possess the potential for
interfering and hampering the primary objectives of the
Federal acquisition process. On the other hand, a general
concensus was reached by most interviewees that present
relationships represent the best possible approach to the
effective and efficient acquisition of complex weaponry,
which demand the skills and services of a multitude of
organizations - both Government and commercial. Therefore,
the only viable approach appears to consist of retaining
the basic philosophy behind present relationships while
striving to achieve those relatively minor modifications
and alterations designed to reduce adversity, incorporate
the highest degree of fairness, and attempt to make the
present system as effective and efficient as is humanly
possible.
It is further envisioned that this research effort will
benefit its readers by providing insight into present
Government - prime contractor - subcontractor relationships
and the necessity and rational for their existence.
Furthermore, it is hoped such insight will provoke addi-
tional thought with regard to inherent problems; resulting
in new ideas, innovation, constructive modification, and
changes to current practices, procedures and policies. If
not, then possibly the mere opportunity to view the issues
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from three different perspectives will lead to at least a
better understanding of the needs, goals, and objectives of
the parties involved which, in and of itself, may lead to a




Questions for Government Acquisition Officials
1. How would you characterize Government - prime contractor
subcontractor relationships? (i.e., legally, formal,
informal, etc.)
2. What do you perceive as the primary objectives of
Government - subcontractor relationships?
3. Are current relationships adequate to achieve these
objectives? If not, what additional relationships are
deemed necessary?
4. Does DOD have an express policy regarding management
of subcontractors or does each procuring agency develop
its own policies and procedures as to subcontractor
management? If no DOD policy, why not?
5. What problems are you currently experiencing regarding
subcontractors?
6. Would altering or changing current relationships help
alleviate these problems?
7. Do you perceive a better way of managing subcontrac-
tors than the methods currently utilized?
8. Do you feel prime contractors are adequately managing
subs under their control? Do contracts incentivize
primes to manage their subs?
9. Do you feel benefits and risk sharing provisions pro-
vided to primes are equitably flowed down to subs?
10. What problems regarding primes do subs bring to the
attention of the Government? What advice or remedies
can the Government provide? How do we typically
respond to subcontractor requests for assistance, etc.?
11. Do you believe the Government has an obligation to
protect the subcontractor base through ensuring equi-
table treatment and fairness between prime and sub?
(i.e., is prime contractor "overreach" improper?) If
yes
y
what can the Government do to alleviate this
practice?
12. What does the Government want from prime contractors
regarding the handling of subcontractors?
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Questions for Prime Contractors
1. Do you perceive that direct or indirect relationships
exist between Government and subcontractors?
2
.
What problems do you experience due to these
relationships?
3. Do you believe Government - subcontractor relationships
are necessary or desirable?
4. Do you feel current Government - subcontractor relation-
ships help or hinder your efforts to effectively manage
your subcontractors and deliver the desired goods or
services?
5. What changes to existing Government - subcontractor
relationships do you believe would benefit the Federal
acquisition process?
6. Would you favor a return to more direct Government
contractual relations with manufacturers of major




1. To what extent is the Government involved in your
subcontracting efforts?
2. How has the Government become involved?
3. Given the Government's current role in your subcon-
tracting operations, what do you perceive the role of
the Government should be regarding a subcontractor '
s
performance on Government contracts?
4
.
What type of image does the Government portray
regarding your operations (i.e., helpful - harmful -
annoyance - etc.)? Why?
5. Characterize your relationship with the prime
contractor
.
6. In negotiating contract terms and conditions what are
your bargaining strengths? What are your weaknesses?
7. As a subcontractor are you in a position to ascertain
the terms, conditions, benefits and risks accorded the
prime contractor by the Government?
8. If so, do you feel the prime fairly and equitably
shares these facets of his contract with you? Why or
why not?
9. Have you ever experienced disputes/disagreements with
primes that could not be settled short of litigation?
If so would direct appeal to the contracting officer
or ASBCA have been helpful? Why?
10. Do you feel you are familiar with the various rules,
regulations, and policies involved in Government
contracting so as to understand the ramifications of
each as they apply to you as a subcontractor?
11. Does the prime contractor assist you in explaining or
interpreting these rules, and regulations?
12. Please describe 3 or 4 problems encountered when
performing as a subcontractor under a Government
contract not experienced when performing as a sub-
contractor under a strictly commercial contract.
13. What changes in current Government policy and proce-
dures do you feel would make your job easier and




14. Do you feel subcontractors are becoming more or less
reluctant to seek Government subcontract work due to






A. Notwithstanding any provisions herein to the contrary,
if a decision on any question of fact or law arising
under the Prime Contract be made by the Contracting
Officer and such question of fact or law is also con-
nected with or related to this subcontract, said decision,
to the extent binding upon the buyer under the Prime
Contract, shall in turn be binding upon the buyer and
the subcontractor with respect to such question under
this subcontract; provided, however, that if the sub-
contractor disagrees with any such decision made by the
Contracting Officer, and if the buyer elects not to
appeal such decision, the subcontractor in his own
name shall have the right reserved to the buyer under
the Prime Contract with the Government to prosecute an
appeal within thirty (30) days, to the Secretary of the
Department which issued the Prime Contract, or his duly
authorized representative. If the buyer elects not to
appeal any such decision, the buyer agrees to notify
the subcontractor within ten (10) days after receipt
of such decision and t> assist the subcontractor in its
prosecution of any such appeal in every reasonable
manner. The buyer, shall, however, be entitled to be
represented at any stage of such prosecution and to be
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kept currently informed of the progress thereof. If
the buyer elects to appeal any such decision of the
Contracting Officer, the buyer agrees promptly to
furnish the subcontractor with a copy of such appeal.
Subject to subdivision B below, any decision upon
appeal to the extent binding upon the buyer, shall be
binding upon the subcontractor. Pending the making
of any decision pursuant to this article, the sub-
contractor shall proceed diligently with performance.
B. In the event any such appeal is, for any reason, denied
or decided adversely to the subcontractor's interests,
or in the event the dispute between the buyer and the
Government with respect to such a question of fact or
law arises after payment with respect to a disputed item
has been made by the Government under the Prime Contract,
then, if the subcontractor continues to disagree with
the disputed conclusion or result, the subcontractor
shall have the benefit of any right which the buyer may
have to prosecute a suit against the United States.
Failure to use such right shall preclude the subcontrac-
tor from objecting to the disputed conclusion or result.
A final judgment in any such suit shall be conclusive
upon the subcontractor and the buyer. The buyer agrees
to assist in the prosecution of any such suit in every
reasonable manner. All costs of any such suit or of any
appeal prosecuted by the subcontractor shall be paid by
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subcontractor, without prejudice to any right the sub-
contractor may otherwise have to recovery or allowance
thereof.
C. Any dispute not disposed of in accordance with sub-
divisions A and B of this Article shall be determined
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